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EVOLUTION OF WATER INSTITUTIONS IN THE INDUS
RIVER BASIN: REFLECTIONS FROM THE LAW OF THE
COLORADO RIVER
∗

Erum Sattar, Jason Robison, ∗∗ and Daniel McCool ∗∗∗
Transboundary water institutions in the Indus River Basin can be fairly
characterized as broken in key respects. International relations between India and
Pakistan over the Indus Waters Treaty, as well as interprovincial relations within
Pakistan over the 1991 Water Accord, speak to this sentiment. Stemming from
research undertaken by the authors for the Harvard Water Federalism Project and
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), this Article
seeks to spur the evolution of the Indus River Basin’s water institutions by offering
a comparative perspective from North America’s most “institutionally
encompassed” basin, the Colorado River Basin. Mindful of the importance of
context for comparative water law and policy scholarship, the Article begins with
overviews of the Colorado and Indus basins. In turn, the Article considers in
greater detail major water-related challenges facing the latter basin, including
climate change and overallocation. Against this backdrop, the Article ultimately
turns to analysis and prescription. Examining a host of topics involving
transboundary water allocation, conservation, and governance, the Article
considers key institutions associated with these topics in the Colorado River Basin
and reflects on how, if at all, they may serve as reference points for institutional
evolution in the Indus Basin. Many of the proposals in the Article are expensive.
But compared to military operations, they are quite modest in terms of expense and
minimize the risk of loss of life and destruction of property. Still, the Article
prioritizes solutions that maximize individual and local freedom to the greatest
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extent possible. This means relying upon voluntary market-based transfers that
protect the vulnerable, favoring incentives rather than regulations, and creating a
reward structure that includes benefits other than water.
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INTRODUCTION
“Blood and water can’t flow together at the same time.” Indian
Prime Minister Narendra Modi made this poignant declaration in
1
September 2016. Modi was getting “tough on Indus treaty” blared
2
3
headlines —referring to the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 (IWT) —

1. Blood and Water Cannot Flow Together: PM Modi at Indus Water Treaty Meeting, INDIAN
EXPRESS (Sept. 27, 2016, 2:50 PM), http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-newsindia/indus-water-treaty-blood-and-water-cant-flow-together-pm-modi-pakistan-uri-attack/.
2. ‘Blood and Water Can’t Flow Together’: PM Narendra Modi Gets Tough on Indus Treaty,
TIMES OF INDIA (Sept. 27, 2016, 3:39 AM), https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/
india/Blood-and-water-cant-flow-together-PM-Narendra-Modi-gets-tough-on-Indus-treaty/articles
how/54534135.cms.
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and had chaired a high-level meeting declaring India’s intent to
“exploit to the maximum” the treaty’s cooperative mechanism gov4
erning flows from the Indus River system to downstream Pakistan.
Several months later in January 2017, at an election rally in India’s
premier agricultural province of Punjab, Modi told farmers that if
they voted the party to power, his government would divert to
them what he characterized as “waste,” referring to Indus waters
5
flowing to Pakistan. The IWT, of course, is no stranger to conflict.
Originally, the World Bank stepped in to lead its fractious negotia6
tions, and it has survived no fewer than four Indo-Pakistani wars.
Nonetheless, Modi’s rhetoric—whether at official meetings in re7
sponse to alleged attacks across the Line of Control, the renamed
original cease-fire line between the two countries, or at political
rallies—poses a grave question: Has international cooperation on
the Indus (albeit historically limited) reached a breaking point?
The IWT is not the sole instrument that inspires such a question.
Interprovincial relations within Pakistan over water from the Indus
River system are less politically charged, but only marginally less
broken. In the decades since the signing of the interprovincial Wa8
ter Accord in 1991, recurring stalemates have been the norm on
bread-and-butter issues such as provincial water shares, dam construction, and the roles of smaller federating units in transboundary water management. Contentious and circuitous claims and
counter-claims continue to fill headlines: “Sindh Will Never Move
Back from Getting 1991 Water Accord Enforced, [Provincial As9
sembly] Told,” “Punjab Farmers Reject 1991 Water Accord With-

3. Indus Waters Treaty 1960, Sept. 19–Dec. 23, 1960, 6032 U.N.T.S. 126, [hereinafter
IWT], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTs/Volume%20419/volume-419-I-6032English.pdf.
4. INDIAN EXPRESS, supra note 1.
5. Assembly Elections 2017: PM Modi Mocks Cong’s ‘Opportunistic’ Alliance with SP, Asks
People Not to Vote for ‘Sinking Ship,’ DNA INDIA (Jan. 27, 2017, 9:05 PM), http://www.
dnaindia.com/india/report-punjab-elections-2017-pm-modi-mocks-cong-s-opportunisticalliance-with-sp-asks-people-not-to-vote-for-sinking-ship-2296751.
6. MAJORITY STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 112TH CONG., AVOIDING
WATER WARS: WATER SCARCITY AND CENTRAL ASIA’S GROWING IMPORTANCE FOR STABILITY IN
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 7 (Comm. Print 2011), [hereinafter SENATE REPORT],
https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Senate%20Print%20112-10%20Avoiding%
20Water%20Wars%20Water%20Scarcity%20and%20Central%20Asia%20Afgahnistan%20
and%20Pakistan.pdf.
7. An unofficial border between India and Pakistan that runs through the Kashmir
region. The Future of Kashmir?, BBC NEWS, news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/south_asia/
03/kashmir_future/html/ (last visited Mar. 24, 2018).
8. Apportionment of the Waters of the Indus River System Between the Provinces of
Pakistan, Mar. 21, 1991, [hereinafter Accord], http://www.pakirsa.gov.pk/WAA.aspx.
9. Habib Khan Ghori, Sindh Will Never Move Back from Getting 1991 Water Accord Enforced, PA Told, DAWN (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.dawn.com/news/1311139.
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out Kalabagh Dam,” 10 “Sindh Rejects Construction of Kalabagh
11
Dam,” and others echo the parade of horribles. Most recently,
Pakistan’s Supreme Court stepped into the fray with the Chief Jus12
tice vowing to see Kalabagh Dam built, followed by the expected
round of criticism of the court’s constitutional role, as well as its
13
backing for the particular project. Reacting to the criticism, the
Chief Justice was quick to clarify that the court did not intend to
hurt the sentiments of any of the federation’s provinces and was
14
instead aiming to solve the country’s water crisis. The court then
moved to support the construction of two other dams, seen as
more acceptable alternatives to Kalabagh, as a way to sidestep the
15
controversy and get some infrastructure built.
It is this dysfunctional, sometimes volatile, environment surrounding the Indus River Basin’s transboundary water institutions
from which this Article stems. Douglass North’s definition of “institutions” informs the usage of that term: “humanly devised con16
straints that structure political, economic, and social interaction.”
The Article’s thesis regarding the Indus Basin’s water institutions is
plain. Government officials tasked with implementing them in
their current forms, as well as evolving successors better adapted to
the twenty-first century, should reflect carefully and critically on
transboundary water institutions in the Colorado River Basin as
reference points. The rationale underlying this suggestion is
straightforward. The Colorado River Basin is “institutionally en17
compassed” in the extreme. It is also navigating an unprecedented drought, a precarious water supply-demand imbalance, and
formidable climate change projections that implicate the lives and
18
livelihoods of thirty-five to forty million U.S. residents. By no

10. Punjab Farmers Reject 1991 Accord Without Kalabagh Dam, BUSINESS RECORDER (Apr. 3,
2010), https://fp.brecorder.com/2010/04/201004031039261/.
11. Sindh Rejects Construction of Kalabagh Dam, DAWN (June 17, 2010), https://www.dawn
.com/news/969905.
12. Kalabagh Dam Will Be Built at any Cost, Remarks CJP Saqib Nisar, NEWS (June 27,
2018),
https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/334447-kalabagh-dam-will-be-built-at-any-costremarks-cjp-saqib-nisar.
13. “It Is Not Apex Court’s Responsibility to Build Consensus on Kalabagh Dam: Khuhro,
EXPRESS TRIBUNE (June 11, 2018), https://tribune.com.pk/story/1732303/1-not-apexcourts-responsibility-build-consensus-kalabagh-dam-khuhro/.
14. See Court Not Pushing for Kalabagh Dam: CJP, NATION (June 10, 2018), https://
nation.com.pk/10-Jun-2018/court-not-pushing-for-kalabagh-dam-cjp.
15. Haseeb Bhatti, SC Asks Public to Donate Money for Construction of Diamer-Bhasha,
Mohmand Dams, DAWN (July 4, 2018), https://www.dawn.com/news/1417934.
16. Douglass C. North, Institutions, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 97, 97 (1991), https://www.aeaweb
.org/articles?id=10.1257/jep.5.1.97.
17. PHILIP L. FRADKIN, A RIVER NO MORE: THE COLORADO RIVER AND THE WEST 16
(1981).
18. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN STAKEHOLDERS MOVING
FORWARD TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY
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means are the Colorado River Basin’s diverse water institutions
panaceas—transboundary allocation schemes, governance arrangements, or otherwise. They are undeniably complex, however,
and in breadth and intricacy offer truly bountiful food for thought
regarding actual and potential options for institutional design. In
no small measure, this referential value can be attributed to the
dynamic, adaptation-forcing context in which the institutions have
been situated over the past two decades of historic drought—a
context involving sustained study and novel innovation at the in19
ternational and interstate levels. Thus, at the base of the framing
of this Article is a belief in the importance of comparative water
law and policy, and a view that such approaches to place-based water problems are essential for “rigorous comparison of water policy
20
alternatives.” The Indus Basin may draw some benefit from this
approach.
Part I begins by emphasizing place and context. It provides overviews of the Colorado and Indus basins aimed at illuminating salient features and associated differences and similarities. Part II, in
turn, delves further into the Indus Basin, surveying major waterrelated challenges facing the basin, such as overallocation and climate change. It then introduces the basin’s key transboundary water institutions, particularly the IWT and interprovincial Water Accord. Finally, Part III constitutes the Article’s analytical and preprescriptive component. It is organized around two substantive
categories: (1) transboundary water allocation and conservation,
and (2) transboundary water governance. Each category encompasses a range of topics implicating particular water laws and policies in the Colorado River Basin, including shortage sharing in the
former category and collaboration in the latter one. In relation to
each topic, the discussion initially details relevant water laws and
policies in the Colorado River Basin and then considers how these
laws and policies might inform future evolution of the Indus Basin’s water institutions. Part III maps out the suite of evolutionary
ideas in full, and a synthesis of them appears in the Conclusion.

DEMAND STUDY, PHASE I REPORT 1-2–1-5 (2015) [hereinafter PHASE I REPORT],
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/MovingForward/Phase1Report/full
report.pdf.
19. See generally Jason Anthony Robison, The Colorado River Revisited, 88 U. COLO. L. REV.
475 (2017) (discussing the composition and evolution of the basin’s international and interstate water allocation framework).
20. See James L. Wescoat, Jr., Comparative International Water Research, 142 J. CONTEMP.
WATER RES. & EDUC. 61, 61–63 (2009).
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I. BASIN OVERVIEWS
Place is important. Institutions governing water resources reciprocally shape and are shaped by distinct conditions and values associated with the particular places in which the institutions are situated. 21 There are cultural, economic, environmental, legal,
political, and social dimensions to this perspective. 22 It is an essential starting point. Any notion that water institutions in one context
(the Colorado River Basin) may serve as reference points for institutional evolution in another (the Indus River Basin) necessarily
must give due regard to contextual nuances. Disregard of this
principle poses a significant risk of institutional imperialism. That
is unacceptable. Proceeding on this basis, the discussion below
conveys initial snapshots of the Colorado and Indus basins.
A. Colorado River Basin
The Colorado River has been aptly described as the “lifeline” of
23
the region through which it flows. Its basin encompasses approximately 244,000 square miles in the southwestern United States
24
and northwestern Mexico (see Figure 1 below). Pursuant to the
Colorado River Compact, the basin is legally and politically bifurcated into an “Upper Basin” and “Lower Basin” at a dividing point
25
called “Lee Ferry” in Northern Arizona. Alpine peaks and high
desert largely characterize the Upper Basin. It is there that the
Colorado River’s headwaters reside—in the majestic Rocky Mountains of Northern Colorado—making for a more than 1,450-mile
26
journey to the river’s mouth in the Gulf of California. Major tributaries in the Upper Basin include the Green River and San Juan
River, the former flowing from southwestern Wyoming’s Wind River Range and the latter from southwestern Colorado’s San Juan
27
Range. In contrast, the Lower Basin largely consists of low desert,
21.

See, e.g., CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FIRE ON THE PLATEAU: CONFLICT AND ENDURANCE
AMERICAN SOUTHWEST 81 (1999)(“Laws rise up from societies and the terrain . . . .
‘For law is organic. Law is part of a time and a place, the product of a specific time and an
actual place.’ Law, in other words, has a habitat.”)(quoting Cherokee legal historian Rennard Strickland).
22. See generally id.
23. Clarence A. Carlson & Robert T. Muth, The Colorado River: Lifeline of the American
Southwest (1986), http://www.nativefishlab.net/library/textpdf/17416.pdf.
24. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Colorado River Basin, in WATER AND WATER RIGHTS 6 (Amy
K. Kelly ed. 2011).
25. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-61-101, art. II(f)–(g) (2016) [hereinafter COMPACT].
26. Jason Robison et al., Challenge and Response in the Colorado River Basin, 16 WATER
POL’Y 12, 20 (Mar. 2014).
27. Cf. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 1-3, fig.1-1.
IN THE
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although some mountainous areas exist. New Mexico’s Black
Range is the Gila River’s headwaters, which is the Lower Basin’s
28
most significant tributary.
From a transboundary perspective, the Colorado River Basin is a
jigsaw puzzle. It is an international and interstate basin that encompasses portions of seven “basin states”—Arizona, California,
Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming—as well as
Baja California and Sonora in Mexico. Within the U.S. portion of
the basin, Colorado, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming are referred
to as the “Upper Division” states, while Arizona, California, and
29
Nevada are referred to as the “Lower Division” states. Indigenous
Peoples relied on the basin’s life-giving waters for millennia prior
to the formation of Mexico, the United States, and their subna30
tional states. In contemporary times, twenty-eight reservations occupied by American Indian tribal sovereigns exist within the basin
states, including the Navajo Nation, the largest reservation in the
31
United States. Federal lands likewise pervade the basin in a variety
of forms, ranging from national parks (such as the Grand Canyon),
to national forests, to national recreation areas, to national wildlife
32
refuges, and beyond.

28. AMERICAN RIVERS, Gila River: The Origin of Wilderness (May 4, 2018), https://www.
americanrivers.org/river/gila-river/.
29. COMPACT, supra note 25, art. II(c)–(d).
30. See Hohokam Canals: Prehistoric Engineering, ARIZONA EXPERIENCE, http://arizona
experience.org/remember/hohokam-canals-prehistoric-engineering (last visited Mar. 23,
2018).
31. For an Indian reservations map, see BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF
INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT C
C-40, fig.C-17 (2012), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/
Technical%20Report%20C%20-%20Water%20Demand%20Assessment/TR-C-Water_
Demand_Assessmemt_FINAL.pdf.
32. For a federal lands map, see U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR,
FEDERAL LANDS AND INDIAN RESERVATIONS (2005), https://nationalmap.gov/small_scale/
printable/images/pdf/fedlands/fedlands3.pdf.
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FIGURE 1. COLORADO RIVER BASIN AND EXPORT AREAS 33

Water institutions in the Colorado River Basin mirror the transboundary relations just discussed in scope and complexity. These
institutions generally fall into intertwined categories of legal and
policy infrastructure and physical infrastructure.
The “Law of the River” is the colloquial term for the former cat34
egory. Subsumed within it is a body of laws and policies that has
35
accumulated mind-bending mass over the past century. A nested
33. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 1-3, fig.1-1.
34. For a useful survey of the Law of the River, see MacDonnell, supra note 24.
35. For a discussion of the composition and evolution of this framework, see Robison,
supra note 19.
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international and interstate allocation framework exists within the
Law of the River made up of (1) an international treaty between
the United States and Mexico (U.S.-Mexico Treaty (1944)); 36 (2)
two interstate water compacts (Colorado River Compact (1922),
37
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (1948)); and (3) a United
States Supreme Court decree issued in the seminal litigation of Ari38
zona v. California (Arizona v. California Decree (1963)). The Law
of the River’s allocation framework is inextricably connected with a
trio of federal statutes that brought into being and continue to
govern operation of the basin’s vast storage infrastructure de39
scribed below—namely, the Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928),
40
the Colorado River Storage Project Act (1956), and the Colorado
41
River Basin Project Act (1968). Entering the scene after the allocation framework and infrastructural legislation had been put into
place is an overlay of environmental laws addressing subjects like
salinity control (Colorado River Basin Salinity Control Act
42
(1974)) and biodiversity and ecosystem protection (Endangered
43
Species Act (1973), Grand Canyon Protection Act (1992)). A wide
range of federal and federal-state bodies are charged with administering different aspects of the Law of the River’s allocational, infrastructural, and environmental components. Examples include the
44
International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S. Bureau of
45
46
Reclamation, and Upper Colorado River Commission. Part III
will elaborate on further attributes of the Law of the River.

36. Treaty for the Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio
Grande, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 3, 1944, T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter Treaty], (entered into force Nov.
8, 1945).
37. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949) [hereinafter Upper Basin Compact]; COMPACT, supra note 25, §§ 37-61-101 to -104.
38. Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006) [hereinafter Decree] (consolidated decree).
39. Boulder Canyon Project Act, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057 (1928) [hereinafter BCPA].
40. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620–620o (2012) [hereinafter
CRSPA].
41. Colorado River Basin Project Act 43 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1556 (2012) [hereinafter
CRBPA].
42. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1571–1599 (2016).
43. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2016); Grand Canyon
Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-575, 106 Stat. 4600 (1992).
44. History of the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S. SECTION, INT’L
BOUNDARY AND WATER COMM’N, https://www.ibwc.gov/About_Us/history.html (last visited
Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter IBWC History].
45. About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, LOWER COLO. REGION,
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2018); About Us, U.S. DEP’T OF
INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, UPPER COLORADO REGION, https://www.usbr.gov/
uc/aboutus/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
46. UCRC Home, UPPER COLO. RIVER COMM’N, [hereinafter UCRC], http://www.ucr
commission.com/index.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
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From a social-engineering versus physical-engineering standpoint, it is difficult to say which is more nuanced: the Law of the
River itself or the plumbing system the legal framework has implanted within the Colorado River Basin. No doubt the latter is diffuse and intricate. Glen Canyon Dam and Lake Powell are the elephants in the room within the Upper Basin, while Hoover Dam
47
and Lake Mead are their counterparts within the Lower Basin.
Taken together, these Goliaths contribute slightly over fifty-three
million acre-feet (maf) of the basin’s more than sixty maf in stor48
49
age capacity. One acre-foot equals 325,851 gallons. They exist
alongside a host of large-scale diversion projects—both in-basin
and transbasin—such as the Central Utah Project, Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, and San Juan-Chama Project within the Upper
Basin, as well as the Central Arizona Project and Colorado River
50
Aqueduct within the Lower Basin.
An imbalance between water supply and demand currently exists
in the Colorado River Basin that affects thirty-five to forty million
people reliant on its water—roughly equivalent to between one-in51
eight and one-in-nine U.S. residents. Water demand has exceed52
ed water supply on average across the past decade, resulting in a
precipitous drawdown of reservoir storage. For example, Lake
Mead’s storage plummeted from 22.4 maf to 9.8 maf from 2000 to
53
2015. On the demand side, agriculture consumes the lion’s share
54
of the basin’s flows (approximately seventy percent), yet the flows
also supply major metropolitan areas in each basin state, including
Denver, Salt Lake City, Albuquerque, and Cheyenne within Upper
Basin export areas, and Los Angeles, Phoenix, and Las Vegas with55
in the Lower Basin proper or export areas.
Turning to the supply side, the basin has been in a historic
drought since 2000, with natural flows at Lee Ferry, the Upper Basin-Lower Basin dividing point, dropping to levels that are lower
than any in a century of recordkeeping and some of the lowest

47. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 1-3, fig.1-1.
48. Robison et al., supra note 26, at 32–33.
49. Water Science Glossary of Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
https://water.usgs.gov/edu/dictionary.html (last modified Apr. 19, 2017).
50. Robison et al., supra note 26, at 33.
51. Compare PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 1 (estimating absolute size of affected
population as of May 2015) with U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
https://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018) (estimating overall U.S. population as of February 15, 2018).
52. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 1-5, fig.1-2.
53. Robison, supra note 19, at 539 tbl.6 (showing reservoir depletion for this period).
54. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 1-2.
55. Id. at 1-3, fig.1-1. Many of these urban centers have grown at staggering rates over
the past few decades. Robison, supra note 19, at 494 tbl.4.
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over the past 1,200 years based on paleo records. 56 Average surface
air temperature in the basin has increased by 2.5 degrees Fahrenheit (1.39 degrees Celsius) since around the turn of the twentieth
57
century. Precisely how the basin’s climate will change going forward remains to be seen, but the Bureau of Reclamation has pro58
jected a mean decrease of 8.7 percent in Lee Ferry flows by 2060,
and researchers have suggested reductions ranging from six per59
cent to forty-five percent by mid-century.
In a nutshell, the Colorado River Basin can be characterized as
an intensely relational, institutionalized, and utilized transboundary basin encompassing some of the most austere, breathtaking terrain in North America. It is also a basin facing a daunting water
supply-demand imbalance and a host of associated challenges. As
outlined in Part III, the past two decades have seen a wide range of
innovative approaches to the Law of the River’s foundational in60
struments in conjunction with the historic drought. These adaptive efforts, as well as the instruments themselves, offer valuable
food for thought in other settings around the world.
B. Indus River Basin
Like the Colorado River, the Indus River is also its region’s lifeline. That region extends from where the river rises in Tibet, in the
upper reaches of the Himalayas, through Indian-administered
Jammu and Kashmir (an area in which the United Nations (U.N.)
61
continues to monitor a ceasefire between India and Pakistan).
Further downstream, it finally enters its most dependent area,
across the international boundary into downstream Pakistan
through the fertile alluvial plains of Punjab and Sindh. The Indus
56. Drought in the Colorado River Basin, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.
gov/water/owdi.cr.drought/en/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2018).
57. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND
STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT B B-16 fig.B-7 (2012), https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20B%20-%20Water%20Supply%
20Assessment/TR-B_Water_Supply_Assessment_FINAL.pdf.
58. Id. at B-65.
59. Letter from Victor R. Baker, Regents’ Professor of Hydrology and Water Res., Univ.
of Ariz., to Sally Jewell, Sec’y of the Interior 1 (Oct. 12, 2015), www.livingrivers.org/pdfs/
LetterToJewell13October2015Final.pdf [hereinafter Baker Letter]. For an excellent article
addressing climate change’s historical and projected impacts on basin-wide flows, see Bradley Udall & Jonathan Overpeck, The Twenty-First Century Colorado River Hot Drought and Implications for the Future, 53 WATER RESOURCES RES. 2404 (2017).
60. See generally Robison, supra note 19 (addressing adaptation of allocation framework).
61. Observing the Ceasefire in Jammu and Kashmir, U.N. MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP IN
INDIA AND PAKISTAN, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmogip (last visited Feb.
15, 2018).
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River ultimately drains into the Arabian Sea via the Indus Delta. 62
The rivers that make up the Indus River system encompass portions of China, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the disputed region of Kashmir (see Figure 2 below).
The Indus Basin accounts for seventy-one percent of Pakistan’s
territory, spanning across four provinces: Punjab, Sindh, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa in their entirety, as well as eastern parts of Balo63
chistan. In terms of sheer scale, interlinked uses, massive human
dependence on river water, and geopolitical complexity, the basin
is unmatched.
FIGURE 2. INDUS RIVER BASIN 64

Habitation along the river system increases the farther downstream one proceeds. This pattern means that human reliance on

62. See generally Azra Meadows & Peter Meadows, Introduction to THE INDUS RIVER:
BIODIVERSITY, RESOURCES, HUMANKIND (Azra Meadows & Peter Meadows eds., 1999).
63. GITANJALI BAKSHI & SAHIBA TRIVEDI, STRATEGIC FORESIGHT GROUP, THE INDUS
EQUATION 3 (2011), www.strategicforesight.com/publication_pdf/10345110617.pdf.
64. International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), The Himalayan Climate and Water Atlas 59 (2015), https://gridarendal-website-live.s3.
amazonaws.com/production/documents/:s_document/20/original/HKHwateratlas2016_
screen.pdf?1483646266.
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the river is greatest in downstream Pakistan, in the heavily settled
provinces of Punjab and Sindh, because of the vast network of irrigation canals built by the British under colonial rule starting in the
65
nineteenth century. British canal development made Punjab the
66
granary of British India. Perhaps ironically for such extensive agricultural development, “[a]round [ninety-two] percent of the
country’s area is classified as semi-arid to arid, facing extreme
67
shortage of precipitation.”
The network of irrigation canals has only grown since the Partition of the sub-continent and Independence in 1947, making the
Indus Basin in Pakistan the largest contiguous irrigation network
68
in the world. Today, it extends over approximately forty-five mil69
lion acres. Given the country’s dependence on this vast irrigation
network, it is difficult to overemphasize the importance of the Indus River system to Pakistan. The constructed and built geography
of the Indus Basin has shaped the country’s actions and continues
to affect its calculus of safety, as explored further below. In addition to the vast economic dependence on irrigated agriculture,
which is responsible for close to a quarter of the country’s gross
70
domestic product and employs nearly half of its labor force, there
is growing reliance on groundwater for irrigation, with attendant
problems of deteriorating water quality.
The most significant addition to the Indus Basin’s water infrastructure occurred as a result of the IWT between India and Pakistan brokered by the World Bank over nearly a decade of negotia71
tions. This Article explores the institutional basis underlying the
IWT, as well as the overall institutional framework of the basin and
its attendant rules for water management, in later sections. Rele-

65. For an excellent history of the development of the canal colonies of the Punjab, see
IMRAN ALI, THE PUNJAB UNDER IMPERIALISM, 1885–1947 (2003).
66. Indermit Gill, What’s In Store for India’s Punjab?, BROOKINGS (Mar. 3, 2017),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2017/03/03/whats-in-store-for-indiaspunjab/.
67. Pakistan, Geography, Climate and Population, FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries_regions/Profile_segments/PAKGeoPop_eng.stm (last visited Feb. 15,, 2018). For a U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration image depicting the basin’s climate, see https://eoimages.gsfc.nasa.gov/
images/imagerecords/62000/62558/Indus.A2002274.0610.250m.jpg.
68. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, IRRIGATION IN
SOUTHERN AND EASTERN ASIA IN FIGURES 6 (2011), http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/
basins/indus/indus-CP_eng.pdf [hereinafter FAO].
69. Indus Basin Irrigation System of Pakistan, TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE MAG., http://www.tbl.
com.pk/indus-basin-irrigation-system-of-pakistan/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
70. JOHN BRISCOE & USMAN QAMAR, WORLD BANK, PAKISTAN’S WATER ECONOMY:
RUNNING DRY xxv (Oxford Univ. Press 2005), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/
en/989891468059352743/pdf/443750PUB0PK0W1Box0327398B01PUBLIC1.pdf [hereinafter BRISCOE & QAMAR].
71. See generally IWT, supra note 3.
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vant here, the IWT spawned a massive infrastructural program, the
Indus Basin Replacement Works, that led to the construction of
two large dams, five barrages, and eight link canals that move water
from the three western rivers to lands previously irrigated by the
72
three eastern rivers allocated to India under the IWT. To manage
these extensive works, Pakistan established a national parastatal
organization, the Water and Power Development Authority
73
(WAPDA), in 1958. However, by the terms of the Government of
India Act 1935—the primary legislative structure of the departing
colonial government that was the primary foundation of further
constitutional development in both India and Pakistan after inde74
pendence —the country retained water management as a provincial subject. It is against this complex backdrop that the discussion
turns to the challenges that water managers in the basin have faced
and the institutions they have evolved within this multi-layered division of authority.
II. WATER CHALLENGES AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE
INDUS RIVER BASIN
Water managers will not lack for work in the Indus Basin in
coming decades, as they confront overallocation, climate change,
and a host of associated challenges. The same can be said about
governmental officials working at the international and interprovincial levels on the basin’s legal and policy water infrastructure.
Both prognoses grow out of the material below. In the course of
shedding light on salient water-related challenges and institutions
in the Indus Basin, the discussion further elucidates the rationale
for this Article’s core thesis: The Colorado River Basin may serve as
a useful reference point for navigating the Indus Basin’s future.

72. For insightful discussions of the IWT and Indus Basin water infrastructure, see
ALOYS ARTHUR MICHEL, THE INDUS RIVERS: A STUDY OF THE EFFECTS OF PARTITION (1967);
DAVID GILMARTIN, BLOOD AND WATER: THE INDUS RIVER BASIN IN MODERN HISTORY (2015);
DANIEL HAINES, RIVERS DIVIDED: INDUS BASIN WATERS IN THE MAKING OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN
(2016); IJAZ HUSSAIN: INDUS WATERS TREATY: POLITICAL AND LEGAL DIMENSIONS (2018).
73. PAK. WATER & POWER DEV. AUTHORITY, http://www.wapda.gov.pk/ (last visited
Mar. 24, 2018) [hereinafter WAPDA].
74. The Government of India Act 1935 was the primary governing statute of British India. See Constitutional History of India, INT’L INST. FOR DEMOCRACY AND ELECTORAL
ASSISTANCE, http://www.constitutionnet.org/country/constitutional-history-india (last visited Mar. 24, 2018). The Constituent Assemblies of both successor countries, India and Pakistan, took it as a foundation for their subsequent drafting of the countries’ respective constitutions.
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A. Overallocation, Climate Change, and Associated Challenges
Perhaps most pressing in the realm of challenges is the basin’s
overallocation. There simply is not enough water for all existing
uses, much less projected needs. Total water withdrawal was estimated to be 149 maf in 2008, which is an overdraft of approximately eighteen maf. 75 According to another estimate, water demands
have outstripped supplies in the basin by eleven to twelve maf an76
nually, and this imbalance is projected to get much worse. As
plainly described roughly a decade ago, Pakistan is “close to using
all of the available surface water and groundwater, yet it is projected that over [thirty] percent more water will be needed over the
next twenty years to meet increased agricultural, domestic, and in77
dustrial demands.” Whether solutions come from adding more
water (difficult to do), increased savings and efficiency (also difficult, but perhaps more desirable and feasible), or some combination of the two approaches, is a matter considered below that ultimately rests with policymakers and water users.
The shortfall in water supplies is exacerbated by unsustainable
78
groundwater pumping coupled with the twin menaces of rising
salinity and waterlogging—a function of canal irrigation on lowlying lands with inadequate drainage. This intertwined problem of
canal irrigation, groundwater overdraft, and rising salinity and waterlogging has a long history in the basin. As part of the United
States’ engagement with Pakistan’s water sector, President Kennedy appointed the White House-Department of Interior Panel on
Waterlogging and Salinity (White House Panel) to study the prob79
lem. While the White House Panel recommended expanding ver-

75. BAKSHI & TRIVEDI, supra note 63, at 3.
76. Id. at 5.
77. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 29.
78. Frank Van Steenbergen & Mohammed Shamshad Gohar, Groundwater Development
and Management in Pakistan, Background Paper #11, in JOHN BRISCOE & USMAN QAMAR,
WORLD BANK, BACKGROUND PAPERS, PAKISTAN’S WATER ECONOMY: RUNNING DRY 444, 446
(2005) [hereinafter BACKGROUND PAPERS], http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/
278641468098987847/pdf/529140WP0Box341University0Press2006.pdf (offering overview
of reliance on groundwater coupled with its lack of regulation and systematic development).
79. See generally WHITE HOUSE-DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR PANEL ON WATERLOGGING AND
SALINITY IN WEST PAKISTAN, REPORT ON LAND AND WATER DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDUS PLAIN
(1964). The central tension that the White House Panel shed light on was that, while using
tubewells to lower the water table was certainly a useful technical fix to Pakistan’s problem,
if the country continued relying on its extensive irrigation network, trying to get the
groundwater balance right was ultimately an unreliable way in which to approach the task.
At the time, it was clear that the country relied too heavily on groundwater for irrigation
and, perhaps, that it was time to consider reducing the acreage under cultivation. Essentially, reducing the cultivated acreage (which would be politically difficult) would have eliminated the need for perpetual groundwater balancing, even if balancing groundwater were
technically possible.
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tical drainage and implementing a coordinated program to sink
“tubewells” to lower the water table and leach salts below the root
zone of plants, it recognized that the remedy of greater groundwater use to control waterlogging and salinity may not work in isolation. 80 Thus, as part of a broader assault on the problem, the panel
also recommended potentially reducing the total irrigated area—a
radical suggestion given the scale of the country’s political econo81
my built up around irrigated agriculture.
Moving forward a half century, the Indus Basin is rife with unsustainable groundwater mining. The aquifer underlying the basin
82
covers 16.2 million hectares. Recent satellite data, however,
ranked the Indus Basin as one of the most overstressed groundwa83
ter basins in the world. This is disturbing news for Pakistan’s
farmers. In Punjab, sixty percent of the water for irrigation comes
84
from groundwater. And yet, “although there is clear evidence that
groundwater is being over-exploited, tens of thousands of addi85
tional wells are being put into service every year.” This trend is
especially troublesome because irrigated agriculture is critical to
the nation’s economy, accounting for a quarter of Pakistan’s gross
86
domestic product and employing about half the labor force.
When it comes to the use of groundwater for irrigation, the num87
ber of tubewells in the subcontinent has grown exponentially. It is
estimated that there are approximately one million tubewells in
Pakistan that pump between one-third to nearly one-half of irrigation water used annually—approximately fifty maf, a massive quan88
tity. The negative externalities of the sheer extent of unregulated
groundwater pumping merit treatment beyond the scope of this
Article. It is worth emphasizing, however, that the Pakistani gov-

80. Id. at 64.
81. Id.
82. BAKSHI & TRIVEDI, supra note 63, at 3.
83. ALEXANDRA S. RICHEY, ET AL., QUANTIFYING RENEWABLE GROUNDWATER STRESS WITH
GRACE, 51 WATER RES. RES. 5217, 5225–26 (NASA Pubs. ed. 2015) (Jul. 14, 2015),
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1159&context=nasapub.
84. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 16; Madison Condon et al., Challenge and Response in the Indus Basin, 16 WATER POL’Y 58, 63 (2014).
85. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at xvi.
86. Id. at xxv.
87. This pattern is to be expected in the absence of any regulatory authority to oversee
private parties’ tubewell development and the growing need for irrigation water.
88. Condon et al., supra note 84, at 63; see also Steenbergen & Gohar, supra note 78, at
444, 446 (offering overview of reliance on groundwater coupled with its lack of regulation
and systematic development); Shahid Ahmad, Water Balance and Evapotranspiration, Background Paper #5, in BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note 78, at 156, 160 (arguing for water balance approach in country’s agro-ecological zones); Shahid Ahmad, Land and Water Resources
of Pakistan—A Critical Assessment, 46 PAKISTAN DEVEL. REV. 911, 927 (2007) (providing comprehensive overview of uses and projected demands of land and water resources) [hereinafter Critical Assessment].
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ernment is aware of this unsustainable reliance on groundwater
and its associated problems and has noted, with concern, that since
the advent of canal irrigation, the water table in half of the country’s irrigated area has risen to within thirteen feet (four meters) of
89
the surface. Before the advent of canal irrigation, recharge of the
aquifer was relatively balanced with withdrawals, and the water table hovered at an approximate depth of 100 feet from the sur90
face. Significant threats to the long-term sustainability of irrigated
agriculture in the basin stem from the rising water table and attendant problems of waterlogging (about twenty-eight percent of
91
the total irrigated area is affected) and salinity (twenty-five percent of irrigated land), which limit overall agricultural productivi92
ty. Unfortunately, there is no real solution in sight to help the
country cope with and repair the unprecedented damage to its water and land resources because of the sheer scale of irrigated agri93
culture.
Reservoirs in the Indus Basin are also plagued with siltation.
While figures vary, both the Mangla and the Tarbela dams are estimated to have lost between twenty and thirty-two percent of their
94
storage capacity to sediment deposition. This pattern forced the
Pakistani government to raise the water level in the Mangla Dam to
increase its capacity, but any additional gain will also eventually be
lost. According to a United Nations report, “[t]here is an urgent
need for storage just to replace capacity that has been lost because
95
of sedimentation.” Yet, replacing storage-diminished reservoirs
with large new storage infrastructure is no small feat and may not
be the best solution for the problem of siltation, which largely results from a combination of the intensity of rainfall and deforesta96
tion in the upper reaches of the dams’ watersheds. Tarbela Dam
was built in 1976, and Pakistan has struggled in the decades since

89. PLANNING COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, NINTH FIVE YEAR PLAN (19982003), REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON WATER RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT 15 (1997)
[hereinafter NINTH FIVE YEAR PLAN].
90. FAO, supra note 68, at 4.
91. Kaiser Bengali & Nafisa Shah, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF MANAGING WATER
xiii (Kaiser Bengali ed., 2003).
92. Waqar A. Jehangir & Nazim Ali, Salinity and Sustainability of Agricultural Productivity
in Irrigated Areas, in id. at 17.
93. NINTH FIVE YEAR PLAN, supra note 89, at 19. See generally WHITE HOUSE-DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR PANEL ON WATERLOGGING AND SALINITY IN WEST PAKISTAN, REPORT ON LAND
AND WATER DEVELOPMENT IN THE INDUS PLAIN (1964).
94. BAKSHI & TRIVEDI, supra note 63, at 7; BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at xiii–xiv;
Mohsin Jamil Butt et al., Sediment Deposition due to Soil Erosion in the Watershed Region of Mangla
Dam, 181 ENVTL. MONITORING & ASSESSMENT 419, 419 (2011) (estimating twenty-percent
loss of capacity).
95. FAO, supra note 68, at 9.
96. Butt et al., supra note 94, at 425–26.
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to initiate new surface reservoirs for the purposes of replacing, as
well as adding to, storage capacity. 97 The country’s farmers turned
to groundwater to fill the water supply-demand gap, as discussed
98
above.
The Indus Basin also has significant water quality problems.
Perhaps as much as forty-four percent of Pakistan’s population
99
does not have access to clean drinking water. As described by a
U.N. report,
Indiscriminate and unplanned disposal of effluents (including agricultural drainage water, municipal and industrial wastewater) into rivers, canals and drains is causing deterioration of water quality in downstream parts . . . . The
polluted water is also being used for drinking in down100
stream areas, causing numerous water-borne diseases.
Increased use of pesticides and fertilizers in agriculture causes
“large-scale uncontrolled pollution of surface water and groundwa101
ter.”
Salinity issues are also significant. Percolation from the irriga102
tion system in Pakistan has resulted in increased salinity levels. In
many areas, soil is encrusted with salt. “[B]y the end of the 1950s[,]
almost [thirty] percent of all Indus Basin farmland was negatively
103
affected by salinity.” An estimated fifteen million tons of salt ac104
cumulates in the basin every year. According to one study, 6.8
million hectares of irrigated land have been compromised by salin105
ity. The problem is worst in Sindh, where half the irrigated land
106
Although increased
is compromised due to salt buildup.
groundwater use alleviated salinity issues somewhat, this “solution,”
107
as noted earlier, led to overdependence on groundwater. Further, while the greater use of groundwater has increased the total
water supply, farmers still need to mix groundwater with canal
supplies to neutralize the higher salinity content of pumped water
through tubewells, particularly in the dryer winter (rabi) planting

97. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 66.
98. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at xvi.
99. BAKSHI & TRIVEDI, supra note 63, at 10.
100. FAO, supra note 68, at 5.
101. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at xvi.
102. FAO, supra note 68, at 5.
103. Condon et al., supra note 84, at 62–63.
104. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at xv, 47–49.
105. BAKSHI & TRIVEDI, supra note 63, at 10.
106. Kaiser Bengali, Water Management Under Constraints: The Need for a Paradigm Shift, in
BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 55.
107. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 15–16.
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season when canal flows are approximately half those of summer
108
(kharif) months. In addition, studies in several areas suggest increases in groundwater salinity. This is partly the result of sinking
wells at deeper depths and partly the consequence of nearly five
decades of pumping. Over time, pumping has churned and mixed
salts to variable degrees in different irrigation zones and caused sa109
line groundwater intrusion in fresh groundwater zones. Unfortunately, little is understood about the hydrological changes within
the basin from the increasingly integrated use of groundwater and
surface water for irrigation. At the end of the day, as John Briscoe
highlighted, “salinity management is the biggest and most funda110
mental environmental challenge in the Indus Basin.”
Finally, there is the specter of climate change—a grave concern
for many river systems throughout the world, including the Colo111
rado River system, as discussed above. The population of Paki112
stan will be “profoundly affected” by climate change. Precisely
what the impacts will be, however, is unclear. Warming could in113
crease glacial melt and exacerbate flooding. It could also reduce
114
precipitation and eventually reduce water supply. Although data
on actual impacts are mixed and do not show consistent patterns
across the region, most models suggest the following pattern in the
Indus Basin: Increased glacial melting will result in flooding for a
period of years. Flooding will be followed by “dramatic decreases in
river flows . . . conceivably by a terrifying [thirty] percent to [forty]
115
percent.” Clearly, “the Indus is vulnerable to climate change because snowmelt and glacier melt from the Western Himalayas
116
comprise a significant portion of its water supply.” The threshold
issue of overallocation that began this discussion of challenges
must be considered in light of these projected impacts.
B. Institutions
The preceding challenges implicate a host of water institutions
in the Indus Basin. While commonly focused on various aspects of
administration, allocation, and infrastructural operation and man-

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

See Critical Assessment, supra note 88, at 912-3, 920, 927.
Steenbergen & Gohar, supra note 78, at 446.
BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 52.
See supra notes 56–59.
SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 10.
Id. at 9–10.
Id.
BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 27.
Condon et al., supra note 84, at 74.
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agement, these institutions are diverse in form. Although Pakistan
and India have a common constitutional origin that laid the basis
for water sharing within the two nations, they have evolved very different mechanisms to manage their respective water resources
since Partition in 1947. The main difference between the countries’ institutions is that India has a greater number and range of
bargaining and dispute-resolution mechanisms (albeit timeconsuming and imperfect) compared to the relative inflexibility of
Pakistan’s institutional mechanisms to apportion water and resolve
117
disputes. This broad distinction generally refers to the capacity of
India’s institutions to adjust claims of different parties across time
versus the greater rigidity of Pakistan’s institutions to make such
adjustments. For the sake of brevity, this Article is limited to the
IWT at the international level and to Pakistan’s federal and interprovincial institutions.
1. “World’s Most Successful Water Treaty”
Signed in 1960 after nearly a decade of negotiation, the IWT is
“considered the world’s most successful water treaty, having remained relatively intact for [fifty] years and having withstood four
118
Indo-Pakistani wars.” The key to the treaty is that it partitioned
the Indus Basin into two halves, with the eastern rivers (the Sutlej,
Beas, and Ravi) going to India, and the western rivers (the Indus,
119
Chenab, and Jhelum) going to Pakistan. India has specific flow
obligations to Pakistan, as it is the upper riparian on the western
rivers that flow through the disputed territory of Kashmir it con120
trols. Notably, there are some exceptions to the basin partition
121
for upstream uses by India in Kashmiri territory it controls.
These specific uses, particularly hydropower generation, are the
greatest source of tensions between the two nations. Nonetheless,
the IWT’s division of the Indus Basin along a political boundary resembles the Colorado River Compact’s bifurcation of that basin’s

117. See generally Alan Richards & Nirvikar Singh, Water and Federalism: India’s Institutions
Governing Inter-State River Waters (1996) (discussing India’s federal water institutions and its
use of tribunals in interstate water disputes), https://people.ucsc.edu/~boxjenk/water
dom.pdf; http://pakbrary.com/council-common-interest-pakistan/. For a fuller discussion
see Erum Khalid Sattar, Water as Power: The Law and Politics of Federalism in the Indus
Basin (May 25, 2017) (unpublished S.J.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with author), 23–104.
118. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 7.
119. IWT, supra note 3, at Arts. II(1) and III(1).
120. Id. at Art. III(2).
121. Id.
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Upper Basin and Lower Basin.122 Although such partitioning may
be politically expedient (or necessary) in certain contexts, it can
pose serious complications for integrated basin-wide water management. Indeed, in 1951, David Lilienthal, the famed chairman of
the Tennessee Valley Authority, proposed integrated management
123
of the Indus Basin in a memorable article published in Collier’s.
The IWT negotiations ruled out that possibility—“the Indus Waters
Treaty reversed [the] principles that David E. Lilienthal had set
124
out in 1951” —and, as Lilienthal had anticipated, many contemporary problems facing the treaty stem from partitioning the basin
125
“for the purposes of large-scale irrigated agriculture” and along
political lines.
The IWT’s partitioning of the Indus Basin had significant domestic implications for water management in Pakistan. With substantial external financial and technical assistance, Pakistan built
the Mangla and the Tarbela dams on the Jhelum and Indus rivers,
respectively, to “mitigate the effect of diverting the three eastern
rivers by India and to increase agricultural production in the [In126
dus Basin Irrigation System].” This added storage, coupled with
several new connecting canals (link canals), made the treaty palatable to Pakistan. At the same time, however, the country’s acceptance of the IWT exacerbated an interprovincial rivalry over the
basin’s water. Downstream Sindh suffered because the link canals
took water from the Indus mainstem to areas of upstream Punjab
that were previously irrigated by the eastern rivers allocated to India by the treaty. Prior to Partition in 1947, a draft Sindh-Punjab
Agreement between the chief engineers of the two provinces of
British India alloted Sindh seventy-five percent of the flow of the
Indus mainstem and Punjab ninety-four percent of the five Punjab
127
rivers. This agreement, although never “ratified for want of a settlement of the financial issue,” represented the provinces’ bilateral
understanding regarding the rightful apportionment of the riv128
ers.
As mentioned earlier, the World Bank played a pivotal facilitative role in IWT negotiations and secured the necessary financial

122. See supra notes 24–25.
123. David Lilienthal, Another Korea in the Making?, COLLIER’S (Aug. 4, 1951).
124. HAINES, supra note 72, at 151.
125. Id.
126. FAO, supra note 68, at 6.
127. Hasan Mansoor, Water Wars: Sindh’s Struggle for Control of the Indus, 15 HIMAL 31, 32
(2002).
128. See Indus River System Authority, Government of Pakistan, Apportionment of Indus
Waters (Promise and Prospects), in Apportionment of Waters of Indus River System Between the
Provinces of Pakistan, Agreement (A Chronological Expose) 17, 19 (1991).
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assistance from friendly governments for the IWT’s implementation. In these endeavors, the Bank enjoyed the full support of the
United States. 129 Notably, the IWT is an embodiment of Pakistan’s
loss of its legal claim to waters from the eastern rivers that previ130
ously flowed to lands it was allotted at Partition. During the
course of the IWT negotiations, it became clear to Pakistani negotiators that they would not be able to sustain their claims to these
waters because India, as the upstream riparian, asserted its right to
131
ownership of the waters as a corollary of its control of territory.
At that juncture, the negotiators switched their position to demand
financial compensation for replacement and development works
that the country would have to construct to bring water from the
132
Indus mainstem to Punjab’s irrigated areas. Subsequently, Pakistan’s negotiators shifted their strategy from claims of legal rights
to water to the scope of a foreign aid package not limited to replacement works. The change in negotiation tactics was justified
domestically as delivering a significant element of “development”
of new water infrastructure financed under the IWT. In short, the
availability of foreign aid made the deal palatable to Pakistan.
Thus, as Aloys Michel noted in his masterful The Indus Rivers, the
final treaty was appropriately “published as an Annexure to the
Development Fund Agreement rather than vice versa,” reflecting
the notion that “the Bank and the ‘friendly Governments,’ chiefly
133
the United States, had actually purchased an agreement.”
Delving a bit further into the IWT’s allocation of Indus River system water: Although Pakistan received seventy-five percent of the
flows, India is free to develop hydropower on the upper reaches of
the western rivers that travel through the disputed territory of
Kashmir—subject to the obligation that such infrastructure does
not adversely affect the timing or quantity of flows for downstream
134
uses in Pakistan, including the flow obligations noted above. Although this critical sense of “security” for downstream Pakistan was
crucial to the IWT’s “bifurcation” of the eastern and western rivers,
135
this aspect of the IWT has been a vitriolic point of contention. As
far as Pakistan’s negotiators were concerned, hardwiring the permissible form of infrastructure design into the IWT was meant to
be the country’s chief protection against India’s potential misuse

129. GILMARTIN, supra note 72, at 214; see also HUSSAIN supra note 72; Lilienthal, supra
note 123; MICHEL, supra note 72, at 219.
130. MICHEL, supra note 72, at 219.
131. Id. at 236; HAINES, supra note 72, at 43.
132. Id. at 240.
133. Id. at 254.
134. IWT, supra note 3, at Art. III(2)(d), Annexure D, Annexure E.
135. HAINES, supra note 72, at 151.

SUMMER 2018] Evolution of Water Institutions in the Indus River Basin 737

of upstream waters in India-controlled Kashmiri territory of the
three western rivers the treaty allocated to Pakistan. Pakistan reluctantly accepted a limited notion of water security based on the
treaty’s limitations on India’s ability to hold back waters of the
western rivers because the IWT addressed some of Pakistan’s very
real apprehensions. Still, the treaty left Pakistan’s fundamental
concerns about territorial vulnerability untouched, as India controls the watersheds of the western rivers via its control of Kashmiri
136
territory. In the intervening years since the treaty was enacted, a
host of factors—imprecise and changing notions of safety, advancements in engineering design, climate change, and India’s
growing demand for electricity—have diminished Pakistan’s already-limited sense of security. What was missing at the time of the
IWT’s formation was flexibility on the part of both countries to adjust to changing conditions and interests surrounding the critical
shared resource of water. Fundamentally, deep mistrust has always
shaped the conflict.
When the IWT divided the Indus River system, Pakistan and India acquired a semblance of water peace and certainty to develop
more assured supplies. The IWT’s attendant monitoring structure,
the Permanent Indus Commission, is composed of a commissioner
from each country who interacts with the water bureaucracy within
137
the respective governments. Planners should look to strengthen
the commission’s technical capacity within the countries in ways
that will lead to better compliance with the treaty’s existing requirements, including data exchange, a general inspection tour by
the commissioners every five years, and at least one annual meeting. More generally, however, the commission’s enhanced status
and capacity will enable it to assume a proactive role in devising
basin-wide solutions. These suggestions are further addressed in
Part III. For present purposes, the commission is flagged as an institutional actor that may benefit from comparative insights.
A host of tensions surround the IWT in contemporary times.
Demands on the Indus River system keep growing, in part due to
growing populations in both countries and their burgeoning expectations for electricity and economic development. A related
complication elaborated below concerns India’s increasing development of projects on the three western rivers that flow through
the territory of Kashmir it controls. This brings into stark relief the
aspirational claims of a long-deprived third party: the Kashmiri
people, who feel left out of the protracted dialogue between the

136.
137.

See id. at 76.
IWT, supra note 3, at Art. VIII.
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two countries and the course of the future development of the Indus. 138 This upstream advantage, even in relation to run-of-the-river
139
projects without the consumptive use that is barred by the IWT,
gives India the potential capacity to control both the quantity and,
crucially, the timing of flows into downstream Pakistan. It is a dynamic that poses formidable challenges for the mechanisms of the
IWT aimed at addressing the precise misgivings Pakistan expressed
140
at the negotiations. The IWT was negotiated between India and
Pakistan in a manner that evaded mention of Kashmir’s disputed
status, while at the same time allowed for agricultural uses and hydroelectric development within prescribed limits by India in
141
Kashmiri territory it controls.
Perhaps unsurprisingly given these tensions, both India and Pakistan have criticized the IWT in recent years, including issuing
calls for possibly abrogating the treaty and warnings that its poten142
tial abrogation will have dire consequences.
In 2005, the Indus Water Commissioners were, for the first time
in the IWT’s history, unable to reach an agreement on an important issue: the design of the Baglihar Dam, a hydropower pro143
ject in India on the Chenab River. A “neutral expert” provided
for by the treaty mediated the disagreement, but conflicts contin144
ue. In 2010, Pakistan filed a case with the International Court of
Arbitration over a new hydropower dam, the Kishanganga project,
145
being built by India along a tributary of the Jhelum River. A Pakistani official warned that the conflict could lead to military con146
frontation. The conflict continues to expand, most recently to
encompass the Kishanganga and Ratle projects, the latter under
147
construction by India on the Chenab River. In September 2016,

138. See Zubair Ahmad Dar, Power Projects in Jammu & Kashmir: Controversy, Law and Justice, LIDS Working Papers 2011-2012, HARV. L. & INT’L DEV. SOC’Y, 4 (2011), https://orgs.
law.harvard.edu/lids/files/2011/11/LIDS-WP-1112-Dar.pdf.
139. IWT, supra note 3, at Arts. III(2)(b).
140. HAINES, supra note 72, at 76.
141. IWT, supra note 3, at Annexure C, Annexure D.
142. From the Pakistani perspective, Ijaz Hussain notes the occasional calls within Pakistan that India is stealing its water. HUSSAIN, supra note 72, at 355. In turn, there is more
pressure from the Indian perspective: “The water issue has triggered a long-simmering backlash in the Indian part, where many at the grassroots feel alienated from mainstream India,
and prompted its elected legislature to call for revision or abrogation of the treaty.” BRAHMA
CHELLANEY, WATER, PEACE, AND WAR: CONFRONTING THE GLOBAL WATER CRISIS 193 (2013).
143. Condon et al., supra note 84, at 69–70.
144. Id.
145. Lidia Polgreen & Sabrina Tavernise, Water Dispute Increases India-Pakistan Tension, N.Y.
TIMES, July 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/21/world/asia/21kashmir.html.
146. CHELLANEY, supra note 142, at 54.
147. Indus Water Dispute going to Arbitration Again, THIRD POLE, July 18, 2016,
https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/07/18/indus-water-dispute-going-to-arbitrators-again/.
The World Bank has hosted talks between the two countries about the projects. Statement on
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amid talk in India that the treaty no longer served the country’s interests, Pakistani officials said that treaty abrogation would be con148
sidered “an act of war.”
It bears reiterating that which is at stake with the IWT to emphasize the gravity of this discourse. As described above, one reason
for the treaty’s significance is that the Indus River is the lifeline of
Pakistan’s agricultural economy. Irrigated agriculture accounts for
149
ninety-seven percent of the country’s freshwater use, and the Indus Basin Irrigation System is the largest contiguous irrigation system in the world, supplying ninety-five percent of Pakistan’s irri150
gated cropland. In turn, as just illustrated, an additional reason
for the IWT’s import is that the Indus River is viewed as a significant part of the solution to both countries’ energy shortfalls. The
potential for hydropower development is a key component in the
river’s management, and Pakistan’s downstream position leaves it
most vulnerable in this regard. Even with the treaty’s safeguards, as
a consequence of India’s rising energy requirements and the push
by the current government to fast-track hydropower development
151
upstream in disputed Kashmiri territory, Pakistan will continue
to face threats to its water supplies, on which vast developed interests depend. Our examination of the Colorado River Basin as an
institutional reference point stems from these concerns. Before
picking up this lens, however, the discussion must turn to Pakistan’s federal and interprovincial institutions.
2. Pakistani Federal and Interprovincial Institutions
Mirroring the situation surrounding the IWT at the international level, the institutional structure of water management in Pakistan is a source of ongoing contestation that produces significant

the Indus Waters Treaty Meetings, WORLD BANK, Press Release, Aug. 1, 2017, http://www.world
bank.org/en/news/press-release/2017/08/01/world-bank-statement-on-the-indus-waterstreaty-meetings; Clarification: World Bank Statement on the Indus Waters Treaty Meetings, WORLD
BANK, Press Release, Aug. 2, 2017, http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/
2017/08/02/clarification-world-bank-statement-on-the-indus-waters-treaty-meetings.
148. Pakistan Warns of “Water War” with India if Decades-Old Indus Water Treaty Violated,
ECONOMIC TIMES, Sept. 27, 2016, http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-andnation/pakistan-warns-of-water-war-with-india-if-decades-old-indus-water-treatyviolated/
articleshow/54548970.cms.
149. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 6.
150. FAO, supra note 68, at 6–7.
151. Neha Dasgupta & Sanjeev Miglani, Troubled Waters? India Fast-Tracks Hydro Projects in
Disputed Kashmir, REUTERS (Mar. 16, 2017, 4:52 AM), https://in.reuters.com/article/indiapakistan-water/troubled-waters-india-fast-tracks-hydro-projects-in-disputed-kashmir-idINKBN
16N0XE.
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mistrust among the federation’s co-sharers. 152 To begin with, during the long course of the IWT negotiations, it became clear to all
involved that the young country of Pakistan lacked an adequate
federal institutional structure for the massive undertaking of build153
ing the large-scale infrastructure agreed to under the treaty. Given these circumstances, the international development community
pushed for the creation of a sufficiently large national organization
that spanned provincial boundaries and would be able to attract
foreign funding, domestic engineering talent, and international
expertise. The Water and Power Development Authority was created to help the young country build what would be “the largest sin154
gle irrigation project in history.” WAPDA’s creation was a milestone in Pakistan’s development history, one that further
strengthened the heavy infrastructure paradigm and reinforced
the country’s economic dependence on an irrigation vision for the
155
Indus Basin.
WAPDA swiftly overtook all other institutional actors in the water sector. Starting with the Government of India Act 1919 and
continuing under the Government of India Act 1935, the devolved
power sharing model provided that irrigation and agriculture were
156
provincial subjects under the constitution of British India. But
the creation of WAPDA and its responsibility for infrastructure development meant that the already inadequately funded provinces
were left further behind. The financial capacity of the provincial
departments, both pre- and post-Partition in 1947, was stagnant,
and the departments were incapable of attracting the most qualified engineers or managers to run the mainstay of the country’s
rural areas—the irrigation system. The federal-provincial imbalance in the water sector continues to have wide ramifications.
In a climate of stagnation, WAPDA was nothing short of a behemoth. Not only was it a national organization with the ability to
cut across provincial borders, but, crucially, it was an entity with
the ability to fund its ambitious plans. James Wescoat describes
WAPDA as “one of the largest river basin planning organizations in
the world—a Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) on a national

152. For an excellent source illuminating these tensions from the perspectives of the
various co-sharers, see ISLAMABAD POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PROBLEMS AND POLITICS OF
WATER SHARING AND MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN (Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema et al. eds., 2007).
153. SAIYID ALI NAQVI, INDUS WATERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE—THE EVOLUTION AND
TRANSITION OF AGRARIAN SOCIETY IN PAKISTAN 339 (2013).
154. MICHEL, supra note 72, at 270.
155. GILMARTIN, supra note 72, at 229.
156. See K.K. Lahiri, Indian River and River Systems—The Genesis of Article 262 of the Constitution of Indian and the Inter-State River Water Dispute Act, 1956 1 INDIAN L.J. (2008),
http://www.indialawjournal.org/archives/volume1/issue_3/article_by_lahiri.html.
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scale,” particularly as “massive construction projects dominated water sector programs.” 157 As early as 1961, it had contracted for “the
158
services of [twenty-eight] foreign consulting firms.” In addition
to its disproportionately greater powers and foreign financial backing, WAPDA’s twin roles of water management and development
for both irrigation and hydropower make it a formidable institution in Pakistan. This observation is especially true vis-à-vis the four
Provincial Irrigation Departments and the Indus River System Authority (IRSA), a coordinating body with federal and provincial
representation created to operate the interprovincial Water Ac159
cord. By enhancing the provinces’ roles in decision-making,
IRSA aims to temper the federal government’s overwhelming presence in water-sector decision-making and operations.
Pakistan’s Water Accord is the chief instrument governing pro160
vincial water shares in the country’s portion of the Indus Basin.
161
Given flow variability, however, delivering fixed quantities of water remains a challenge. To cope with this dynamic, IRSA has devised several heavily contested allocation measures—as distinct
from the accord’s shares—that keep the accord operational on its
face yet contradict its text, mechanism, and intent. These measures
include: (1) a three-tier allocation formula that protects historical
uses in different water-availability scenarios over the accord’s pro
162
rata water sharing formula, and (2) an exemption from shortage
163
sharing for smaller provinces.
The Council of Common Interests, the relevant constitutional
164
body, agreed to the accord in 1991. Nevertheless, despite the
“agreement,” the meaning of the accord’s text and its omissions
has been a significant source of controversy. The ongoing disagreements about the parties’ original intent continue to cause

157. James Wescoat, The Historical Geography of Indus Basin Management: A Long-Term Perspective, 1500-2000, in AZRA MEADOWS & PETER MEADOWS, THE INDUS RIVER: BIODIVERSITY,
RESOURCES, HUMANKIND 416, 424 (1999).
158. EDWIN BOCK & ALBERT GORVINE, A SCIENTIFIC PANEL IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS: THE
REVELLE REPORT 5 (1962).
159. For a more detailed study of this competing institutional structure, see generally
Sattar, supra note 117.
160. See id. at 28.
161. For example, summer monsoon and glacial melt combine to yield about eighty-five
percent of annual basin-wide flows. Condon et al., supra note 84, at 74.
162. The three-tier allocation formula primarily privileges developed, upstream uses in
Punjab. Muhammad Idris Rajput, Water Problem: Perspective from Sindh, in PROBLEMS AND
POLITICS OF WATER SHARING AND MGMT. IN PAKISTAN, 117–27 (Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema et al.
eds., 2007). For a detailed study of this competitive interpretation, see Sattar, supra note 117.
163. “Smaller” in terms of a province’s relative share and use of Indus Basin waters. It
includes the very large province of Balochistan, as well as the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK)
province. For further discussion of these measures, see Sattar, supra note 117, at 64–68.
164. Id.
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enormous friction, resulting in an ever-present atmosphere of controversy with merely episodic and unstable workarounds that keep
165
the system running. As one expert observed, “[u]nity and cohesion among federating units is important for national security. Any
discord and disunity is harmful for Pakistan’s survival. However, in166
terprovincial water issues crop up frequently.”
To take just one instance of the accord’s unstable operation,
WAPDA is supposed to operate under IRSA’s authority to implement the accord. For example, IRSA tells WAPDA to release water
from reservoirs as part of IRSA’s authority to apportion water
167
among the provinces. The accord prioritizes irrigation over all
168
other uses, including hydropower production. Although the latter is a non-consumptive use, it has potentially significant impacts
on flow timing, which is a critical issue in irrigation that can affect
the accord’s operation during any ten-day period of warabandi
169
(time allocation of water) for farmers. Illustrating the tension between hydropower and irrigation vis-à-vis the accord, IRSA comes
under immense political pressure from the federal Ministry of Wa170
ter and Power (as it was then called) to “authorize” WAPDA to
release more water for hydropower production despite the accord’s irrigation priority, particularly during power shortages/blackouts (loadshedding) that can last eighteen hours per day
171
at summer’s peak. Overall, the institutional arrangement gives
rise to serious tensions. Instead of promoting better outcomes, institutional operations place pressures on different actors in the system, with the greatest pressure falling on institutions designed to
enhance the provinces’ role in decision-making. This interagency
tension hampers the robust operation of federalism that the insti172
tutions have been designed to promote.

165. For further discussion of the accord, see id. at 23–104.
166. Muhammad Idris Rajput, Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency,
Inter-Provincial Water Issues in Pakistan 9 (draft 2011), http://www.pildat.org/publications/
publication/WaterR/Inter-ProvincialWaterIssuesinPakistan-BackgroundPaper.pdf.
167. See WAPDA, supra note 73. But see Accord, supra note 8.
168. Accord, supra note 8, at ¶14.c.
169. As discussed above, in the international context, India’s construction of hydropower schemes, even without storage, leads to similar feelings of vulnerability in downstream
Pakistan.
170. The twin functions of the Ministry of Water and Power were devolved to two separate newly-created ministries in August 2017, with the “water” component being assigned to
the Ministry of Water Resources and the “power” component to the new Ministry of Energy.
Pakistan PM Creates New Ministries, GULF TIMES (Aug. 6, 2017, 12:12 AM), http://www.gulftimes.com/story/559153/Pakistan-PM-creates-new-ministries.
171. See e.g., More Dam Water Released to Cut Loadshedding, Dawn, Oct. 4, 2010,
https://www.dawn.com/news/851820/more-dam-water-released-to-cut-loadshedding.
172. See Sattar, supra note 117, at 23–105.
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In light of the preceding example and others, such as the enormous amount of friction and drag associated with operating infra173
structure like water-transporting link canals, there are calls to
update the accord, including to allow trading across provincial
174
boundaries, which the government has not heeded. With increasing uncertainty about the amount and timing of flows given climate change’s effects on headwater glaciers, it is clear that Pakistan
must move towards a more flexible system across interprovincial
boundaries. Further, the current approach of forging temporary
resolutions to particular problems does not move the parties toward a long-term, stable working relationship. It also does not foster trust or create capacity to envision solutions aimed beyond immediate fights over provincial water shares.
Claims about the meaning of the accord’s text have been rattled
like sabers by the interested parties. This includes competing
claims about what was meant by the text at the time of the accord’s
adoption, as well as competing claims about what was meant to be
included within that text but was not for various reasons having to
do with complex politics. Taken together, all of this continues to
destabilize interpretations of the accord’s express language. These
controversies and mistrust run squarely contrary to official rhetoric
regarding the accord at the time of its adoption, when effusive language was used to describe its significance:
21st March, 1991, will go down in the history of Pakistan as
a pivotal breakthrough in its leap towards the 21st century
and turning point in its march towards national consolidation. On that day, a dispute unraveled that had been festering in this part of the subcontinent for the past seventy
175
years.
More than a quarter of a century later, this aspiration remains
just that—aspirational.

173. Ramzan Chandio, Sindh Objects to Water Release in CJ Canal, NATION, Mar. 6, 2011,
http://nation.com.pk/national/06-Mar-2011/Sindh-objects-to-water-release-in-CJ-LinkCanal.
174. Arif Anwar, Pakistan’s Provincial Water Disputes: A Way Forward, THETHIRDPOLE.NET,
July 28, 2016, https://www.thethirdpole.net/2016/07/28/pakistans-provincial-water-disputesa-way-forward/.
175. See Accord, supra note 8, at pmbl.
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III. REFLECTIONS FROM THE LAW OF THE COLORADO RIVER
The Colorado River Basin and Law of the River now reenter the
scene. An enormous body of literature exists in this domain, and a
dizzying number of ideas and proposals for solving water management problems in the basin have been generated over the nearly
100 years since the Colorado River Compact was signed. 176 Some of
these proposals have become law, some are currently being implemented, and some have yet to be accepted as part of the accumulated institutional mass constituting the Law of the River. It is
the complexity and diversity of this institutional mass—coupled
with the adaptation-forcing circumstances in which it is currently
situated—that underlie its referential value for transboundary water law and policy.
More precisely, the discussion below is framed around a handful
of allocation- and conservation-related topics, complemented by
explanations of a few governance counterparts. It is aimed at identifying key aspects of the Law of the River’s evolution. The past two
decades are the primary (though not exclusive) timeframe, as the
historic drought’s onset in 2000 has made it a “mother of invention” in numerous ways. Underpinning the entire discussion is an
earnest hope that the selective, non-exhaustive reference points
from the Colorado River Basin may bear fruit of some sort within
the Indus Basin. Each section is composed accordingly, initially
discussing laws and policies associated with the Law of the River,
and then considering how the particular subject matter may spark
contextually tailored innovations within the Indus Basin.
A. Transboundary Water Allocation and Conservation
1. Allocational Flexibility
177
Rivers are dynamic systems. They change in fundamental ways,
178
ranging from seasonal to millennial. Thus, the optimal transboundary water allocation frameworks are those that have built-in
flexibility enabling the particular distributional scheme to adjust
equitably to changes in conditions, such as precipitation, tempera179
ture, evapotranspiration, and runoff, as well as associated values.

176. See MacDonnell, supra note 24.
177. STANLEY A. SCHUMM, RIVER VARIABILITY AND COMPLEXITY 4 (2005).
178. Id.
179. See Jason A. Robison & Douglas S. Kenney, Equity and the Colorado River Compact, 42
ENVTL. L. 1157, 1179 (2012) (discussing principle of flexibility as aspect of water apportionment schemes’ substantive equity).
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Climate change is a key concern for the Colorado and Indus basins
implicating these considerations. 180 The Law of the River offers a
curious reference point for allocational flexibility—a statement
that holds true at the international and interstate levels.
Most notable in the international arena is Article 10(b) of the
181
U.S.-Mexico Treaty. It provides for augmentation of treaty deliveries to Mexico when surplus water exists and delivery reductions
in the event of an “extraordinary drought or serious accident to
182
the irrigation system in the United States.” Serious ambiguities
and implementation issues plague the provision’s text—for exam183
ple, it does not provide a definition of “extraordinary drought.”
Yet it nonetheless shows that the drafters gave some modicum of
thought to the international apportionment’s flexibility.
Further illustrations appear at the interstate level in the United
184
States. Although it is inflexible in several ways, the Colorado Riv185
er Compact does espouse flexibility in Article III(d). This provision prohibits the Upper Division states from causing the Colorado
River’s flow at Lee Ferry to be depleted below seventy-five maf dur186
ing any consecutive ten-year period. The decadal nature of this
obligation provides the states with flexibility to respond to annual
187
hydrological variability.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (Upper Basin Compact) offers a second example. Its apportionment scheme for the
Upper Division states is percentage-based. The states’ apportionments hinge on applying specific percentages to the collective
amount of consumptive water use “apportioned in perpetuity to[,]
and available for use each year by[,]” the Upper Basin under the
188
Colorado River Compact. As this proverbial collective pot of water contracts or expands, so do the states’ apportionments.
A final illustration comes from the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. California and its Lower Colorado River appor189
tionment. It involves a three-tier scheme. The Lower Division
states’ collective and individual consumptive uses of Lower Colora-

180. See supra Part I.A (Colorado) and Part II.A (Indus).
181. Treaty, supra note 36, at Art. 10(b).
182. Id.
183. Robison, supra note 19, at 503–505.
184. Robison & Kenney, supra note 179, at 1199–1201.
185. COMPACT, supra note 25, at Art. III(d).
186. Id.
187. Robison & Kenney, supra note 179, at 1201.
188. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 37, at Art. III(a)(2). The states’ percentage-based
apportionments are Colorado (51.75 percent); New Mexico (11.25 percent); Utah (23 percent); and Wyoming (14 percent). Id. Although not an Upper Division state, Arizona is apportioned 50,000 acre-feet of consumptive use annually. Id. at Art. III(a)(1).
189. See Decree, supra note 38, at Art. II(B)(1)–(3).
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do River water depend upon the Secretary of the Interior’s annual
determination of whether normal, surplus, or shortage conditions
190
This determination circumscribes the apportionments.
exist.
Further, the Arizona v. California Decree authorizes the Secretary to
reallocate water apportioned to, but unused in, one Lower Division
191
state to other Lower Division states on a yearly basis.
Looking beyond the Law of the River’s allocation framework
proper, several measures adopted in response to the historic
drought provide additional examples of integrating flexibility into
the framework’s nested international and interstate apportionments. Two instruments are most salient as sources of these
192
measures: Minute 323 to the U.S.-Mexico Treaty and the Colorado River Interim Guidelines for Lower Basin Shortages and the
Coordinated Operations for Lake Powell and Lake Mead (Interim
193
Guidelines). The shortage sharing section below takes up these
instruments and their respective measures.
Reflecting on the foregoing aspects of the Law of the River vis-àvis the Indus Basin, the IWT might benefit from a variabledeliveries scheme addendum—that is, a treaty addendum creating
a scheme to introduce variation in expected flows when certain
conditions arise. India has specific flow obligations to Pakistan un194
der the treaty. The countries could create a scheme that accommodates flow variability. This would be particularly useful as a way
for Pakistan to be financially compensated in the event that India
materially alters flow timing due to hydropower generation—the
195
source of current tensions. Subsidies or payments could abet this
scheme to ensure all parties get something out of the deal. It is
worth remembering here the funding conditions described earlier
surrounding the IWT’s formation: Led by the United States, India
and a host of foreign governments compensated Pakistan for the
Indus Basin Replacement Works program that was constructed to
tap alternate sources for the waters of the eastern rivers granted to
190. Id.
191. Id. at Art. II(B)(6).
192. See INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, MINUTE NO. 323: EXTENSION OF
COOPERATIVE MEASURES AND ADOPTION OF A BINATIONAL WATER SCARCITY CONTINGENCY
PLAN IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN, U.S.-MEX., (Sept. 21, 2017) https://www.ibwc.gov/
Files/Minutes/Min323.pdf [hereinafter MINUTE 323].
193. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER
BASIN SHORTAGES AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS FOR LAKE POWELL AND LAKE MEAD (Dec.
2007), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/strategies/RecordofDecision.pdf [hereinafter Interim Guidelines ROD].
194. IWT, supra note 3, at Art. III(2)(a)–(d). These provisions require India to let the
waters of the western rivers flow to Pakistan without interference.
195. See India to Fill Up Kishanganga Reservoir This Year, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS (June 21,
2017), http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/jun/21/india-to-fill-up-kishangangareservoir-this-year-1619039.html.
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India. 196 Overseeing this program was a neutral organization established to monitor fund releases per agreed upon schedules. In
short, notwithstanding the difficulty and complexity of current relations, these earlier developments may be luminaries for a potential variable-deliveries scheme addendum to the IWT.
In envisioning the composition and implementation of such a
scheme for the treaty, it may be prudent to initially focus on the interprovincial Water Accord and its contemplated flexible opera197
tion in response to changing hydrological conditions. If Pakistan
can begin operating a flexible scheme among its provinces—one
involving proportionate sharing of surpluses and shortages instead
of the current three-tier system that protects and privileges histori198
cal upstream uses —the country may gain valuable experience for
developing a transparent and trustworthy analogue under the IWT.
As described earlier, in recognizing that the accord’s fixed water
deliveries cannot be met because of inherent flow variability,
IRSA’s so-called “three-tier” scenario allows it to adjust provincial
199
Unlike the Colorado River Basin, where formal
deliveries.
measures have been forged for variability-based adjustments at the
international and interstate levels, IRSA’s functional interpretation
of the IWT has a long history of contestation and operation that
200
breeds mistrust. Instead of devising a practical working formula
and adhering to it transparently, IRSA’s operations sow discontent
with charges that the lower riparian has been deprived of its due
201
share under the accord, especially at key planting times. Planners
should formulate a better approach and devise working norms that
bring all parties together. Greater collaboration within Pakistan’s
federal system may create learning opportunities for the best way
to undertake similar processes across the international border—as
202
happened in the Colorado River Basin. The uncertainty posed by
projected climate-change impacts and increased water demands in
the Indus Basin dictates that planners need to consider new ways of
developing adaptive systems proactively now rather than being
forced to do so reactively later.

196. IWT, supra note 3, at Art. V.
197. See, e.g., Accord, supra note 8, ¶ 14.b.
198. Rajput, supra note 162, at 117–27; Sattar, supra note 117, at 64–68.
199. Rajput, supra note 162, at 117–27.
200. Id. at 120–23.
201. Mohammad Hussain Khan, Why There Is a Shortage of Irrigation Water in Sindh,
HERALD (July 24, 2017, 10:48 AM), http://herald.dawn.com/news/1153816/why-there-is-ashortage-of-irrigation-water-in-sindh.
202. This pattern is evident in the evolution of shortage sharing schemes developed under the Interim Guidelines (domestic) and Minute 323 (international) in 2007 and 2017,
respectively.
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In sum, the Law of the River’s institutional precedents involving
allocational flexibility are directly relevant to potential flexibilityoriented water sharing schemes in the Indus Basin, both under the
IWT as well as the accord. Transparency in collaborative modification of existing agreements is absolutely necessary in order to
reach agreement among affected parties.
2. Shortage Sharing
We now turn to the intertwined topic of shortage sharing and
begin with a sobering truth: The Colorado River Compact was
203
based on faulty hydrological data. Negotiators relied on erroneously high flow estimates when they crafted the Compact’s appor204
tionment scheme. This historical reality is problematic given the
quantity-based—rather than percentage-based—nature of the
205
scheme’s apportionments and flow obligations. Suffice it to say
that the historic drought’s onset in 2000 has posed serious challenges for the scheme’s implementation and that climate change
projections suggest these challenges are a harbinger of what lies
206
ahead. It is one of several situations surrounding different components of the Law of the River that speaks to the conjoined topics
of overallocation, water supply-demand imbalance, and ultimately
shortage sharing. To say these topics are relevant in the Indus Basin would be soft-pedaling.
As mentioned above, Minute 323 of the U.S.-Mexico Treaty is a
key instrument in this realm. The treaty apportions 1.5 maf of Col207
orado River water to Mexico annually. Although treaty deliveries
may be reduced if an “extraordinary drought or serious accident to
208
the irrigation system in the United States” occurs, this clause is
209
rife with ambiguities and implementation issues, as noted earlier.
203. COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE, RETHINKING THE FUTURE OF THE
COLORADO RIVER: DRAFT INTERIM REPORT OF THE COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE INITIATIVE
70 (2010), http://www.waterpolicy.info/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/CRGI-Interim-Report.pdf.
204. Id.
205. The Compact apportions to the Upper Basin and Lower Basin, respectively, the
beneficial consumptive use of 7.5 maf and 8.5 maf of Colorado River system water annually.
COMPACT, supra note 25, at Art. III(a)–(b). The Compact also prohibits the Upper Division
states from depleting flows at Lee Ferry below 75.0 maf during any consecutive ten-year period. Id. at Art. III(d). In addition, the Compact contemplates the Upper Basin and Lower
Basin fulfilling a 1.5 maf annual flow obligation to Mexico. Id. at Art. III(c); Treaty, supra
note 36, at Art. 10(a).
206. See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. See generally JAMES LAWRENCE POWELL,
DEAD POOL: LAKE POWELL, GLOBAL WARMING, AND THE FUTURE OF WATER IN THE WEST
(2008).
207. Treaty, supra note 36, at Art. 10(a).
208. Id. at Art. 10(b).
209. Robison, supra note 19, at 503–05.

SUMMER 2018] Evolution of Water Institutions in the Indus River Basin 749

Forged in 2017, against the backdrop of a formative predecessor,
Minute 319, 210 Minute 323 fills this vacuum. While leaving the trea211
ty’s “escape clause” intact, Minute 323 establishes a shortage
sharing regime for the international apportionment that will re212
main effective until December 31, 2026. In short, this regime
calls for annual treaty delivery reductions of 50,000, 70,000, or
125,000 acre-feet depending upon Lake Mead’s projected eleva213
tion. Complementing Minute 323’s shortage sharing regime is a
“Binational Water Scarcity Contingency Plan” requiring each country “to save specified volumes of water at certain low reservoir elevations for recovery at a later date when reservoir conditions im214
prove.” At the time of this writing, this plan has not yet taken
effect, as its implementation hinges on formation of a pending
domestic Lower Basin Drought Contingency Plan in the United
215
States.
Parallel measures have emerged domestically in the United
216
States under the Interim Guidelines. Adopted in 2007, several
years after the beginning of historic drought, the guidelines established a coordinated operating regime for Lake Powell and Lake
Mead that serves to implement the Colorado River Compact’s apportionment scheme. More precisely, the regime implements flow
obligations to Mexico and the Lower Division states imposed by the
217
Compact’s scheme. A nuanced relationship exists between these
218
flow obligations and the regime. Broadly speaking, however, the

210. INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, MINUTE 319: INTERIM INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATIVE MEASURES IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN THROUGH 2017 AND EXTENSION OF
MINUTE 318 COOPERATIVE MEASURES TO ADDRESS THE CONTINUED EFFECTS OF THE APRIL
2010 EARTHQUAKE IN THE MEXICALI VALLEY, BAJA CALIFORNIA (2012), https://www.ibwc.gov/
Files/Minutes/Minute_319.pdf [hereinafter MINUTE 319].
211. See MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 22 (disclaiming any effect on Article 10(b)’s interpretation or application).
212. Id.
213. Id. at 4. See also MINUTE 319, supra note 210, at 6 (establishing a shortage sharing
regime in 2012 involving the same treaty-delivery reductions and elevation tiers).
214. MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 6–8. The countries’ respective savings requirements
are set forth in a graduated, standardized manner tethered to Lake Mead’s projected elevation. Id. at 7.
215. Id. at 8.
216. Interim Guidelines ROD, supra note 193. For useful scholarship on the guidelines’
formation, see generally Douglas Grant, Collaborative Solutions to Colorado River Water Shortages: The Basin States’ Proposal and Beyond, 8 NEV. L.J. 964 (2008); Patricia Mulroy, Collaboration
and the Colorado River Compact, 8 NEV. L.J. 890 (2008); W. Patrick Schiffer et al., From a Colorado River Compact Challenge to the Next Era of Cooperation Among the Seven Basin States, 49 ARIZ.
L. REV. 217 (2007).
217. See COMPACT, supra note 25, at Art. III(c)–(d) (imposing flow obligations).
218. See Robison, supra note 19, at 517–20 (examining relationship between Articles
III(c) and (d) of Compact, § 602(a) of Colorado River Basin Project Act, Long-Range Operating Criteria, and Interim Guidelines’ coordinated operating regime).
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volume of annual releases from Lake Powell hinges on the relative
elevations of (and thus storage in) that reservoir and Lake Mead. 219
Downstream of Lee Ferry, the Interim Guidelines also established an operating regime for Lake Mead that implements the Arizona v. California Decree’s Lower Colorado River apportion220
ment. This regime was the predecessor to Minute 323’s shortage
221
sharing regime, and thus their similar composition makes sense.
In its current iteration, the guidelines’ domestic regime insulates
222
California from sharing shortages, but calls for Arizona and Nevada to reduce their consumptive use of Lower Colorado River water by prescribed amounts related to Lake Mead’s projected eleva223
tion. The elevation “triggers” for these reductions mirror Minute
224
323’s.
The Law of the River’s shortage sharing regimes bring benefits.
They promote conservation through rationing, create predictability through tiered delivery-reduction schedules, and, to some degree, generate comity and equity in international and interstate relations over the Colorado River system. Similar approaches might
resonate within the Indus Basin.
Initially, the development of a joint scarcity-management plan
would not require renegotiating the IWT. Rather, India and Pakistan would agree to an addendum authorizing specific responses in
each country when low flows make it impossible to meet established needs. Such a plan would foreseeably dovetail with the variable-deliveries scheme mentioned in the allocational-flexibility section. Key tenets of the scarcity-management plan would include
equitable sharing of shortage-based hardships, predictable guidelines for shortage adaptations (that is, delivery reductions), and
clearly delineated processes for implementing adaptive measures.
From a temporal perspective, creating such a plan before actual
shortages occur would obviously be preferable to ad hoc, spontaneous, and uncoordinated responses. That alternative is a potential
recipe for disaster.

219. Interim Guidelines ROD, supra note 193, at 49–53.
220. Id. at 34–37, 59.
221. See MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 3–6. This regime was also the predecessor to Minute 319’s shortage sharing regime adopted in 2012. MINUTE 319, supra note 210, at 6–7.
222. The Lower Basin drought contingency plan currently under discussion contemplates California sharing in Lower Colorado River shortages. Robison, supra note 19, at 543.
223. Interim Guidelines ROD, supra note 193, at 36–37. The guidelines’ regime calls for
reductions of 320,000, 400,000, or 480,000 acre-feet for Arizona, and 13,000, 17,000, or
20,000 acre-feet for Nevada. Id. These reduction amounts are based upon the states’ respective apportionments under the Arizona v. California Decree during normal conditions. Decree, supra note 38, at Art. II(B)(1).
224. Id.; MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 4.
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As for interprovincial shortage sharing within Pakistan, the Water Accord provides a solid basis for working toward greater clarity
at the interprovincial level and facilitating a potential analogue for
the IWT. As mentioned above, the accord calls for pro rata shortage sharing at the national level based upon adjustments to indi225
vidual canal and barrage systems. Currently, however, instead of
providing a collaborative and transparent basis for pro rata adjustments, the relevant provision is victim to opaque interpretations and implementation by IRSA. These discrepancies aim to
protect and privilege historical upstream uses over equitable arrangements in which all parties receive water proportionate to
226
their shares according to overall water availability. Pakistan has a
valuable opportunity to move beyond these tensions, to operationalize the accord, as per the intent of its framers, and to adjust to
variable flow conditions. Yet, doing so will require bold leadership
and a willingness to confront existing privileged interests. If institutions such as IRSA can become adaptive learners in coping with
variability and uncertainty associated with climate change and other dynamic factors—and do so collaboratively with all actors—it
will help both IRSA and other parties become key sources of
knowledge generation and dissemination. By developing such
working norms within its boundaries, Pakistan would also develop
a wealth of operational knowledge that would help in any future
IWT negotiations with India to create a joint scarcity-management
plan.
3. Demand Management vs. Structural “Solutions”
Many experts view demand management as the best future
227
source of additional water supplies. A host of options exist for
water conservation in the agricultural, municipal, and industrial
228
sectors. Demand management becomes even more compelling
225. Accord, supra note 8, at para. 14(b). In contrast, surplus sharing is done according
to specified percentage allocations for the provinces. Id. at para. 4.
226. Sattar, supra note 117, at 68–69.
227. See, e.g., James Wescoat, Water Shortages and Water-Conserving Urban Design in Pakistan,
in RUNNING ON EMPTY: PAKISTAN’S WATER CRISIS 129, 139–42 (Michael Kugelman & Robert
M. Hathaway eds., 2009) (addressing how water shortages currently harm, and will continue
to harm, rapidly increasing urban populations). See generally JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMITH &
PETER GLEICK, TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY U.S. WATER POLICY (2012); ROBERT GLENNON,
UNQUENCHABLE: AMERICA’S WATER CRISIS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2009); Robert Evans
& John Sadler, Methods and Technologies to Improve Efficiency in Water Use, 44 WATER
RESOURCES RESEARCH 1 (2008); SANDRA POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY
(1997).
228. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND
DEMAND STUDY, TECHNICAL REPORT F – DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIONS AND STRATEGIES F-38 to -
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when considering the externalities of structural solutions. All dams
have an engineered lifespan and must be replaced—an expensive
endeavor. Canal systems typically have significant operation and
maintenance costs. All reservoir sites fill with sediment, rendering
them useless and creating the enormous problem of what to do
with a sediment-filled reservoir on a river. And there are other, less
obvious but perhaps more inimical problems: “Most transboundary
water conflicts arise not over natural supplies but over human interventions to manage them. Dams, irrigation diversions, and other
infrastructure alter both hydrological relations, affecting the quantity, quality, and timing of downriver flows, but also relations be229
tween upstream and downstream riparians.” The Indus Basin
epitomizes this quote.
Structural solutions were the dominant water management paradigm in the Colorado River Basin for much of the twentieth century. Congress enacted a slew of federal water infrastructure legislation during the middle of the century, resulting in basin-wide
230
storage capacity of more than sixty maf. As identified earlier,
231
these laws included the Boulder Canyon Project Act (1928), Col232
orado River Storage Project Act (1956), and Colorado River Ba233
sin Project Act (1968). The first statute brought into existence
234
Hoover Dam and Lake Mead, while the second statute did the
same for Glen Canyon Dam, Lake Powell, and a trio of accompanying large-scale dams and reservoir projects in the Upper Basin
235
(Flaming Gorge, Navajo, and Aspinall). As for the third statute,
its polestar was not a landmark dam and reservoir, but rather an
extensive, expensive canal system called the Central Arizona Pro236
ject (CAP). Authorized in 1968, and reaching “substantial com237
pletion” in 1993, the CAP is the last major federal water project

53 (2012) (evaluating agricultural and municipal and industrial water conservation options
in Colorado River Basin), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/
Technical%20Report%20F%20-%20Development%20of%20Options%20and%20Stategies/
TR-F_Development_of_Ops&Strats_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter TECHNICAL REPORT F].
229. STIMSON CTR., FRESH WATER FUTURES: IMAGINING RESPONSES TO DEMAND GROWTH,
CLIMATE CHANGE, AND THE POLITICS OF WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT BY 2040 4 (2010),
https://www.stimson.org/sites/default/files/file-attachments/StimsonCenterConfWater
Report_1.pdf.
230. Robison et al., supra note 26, at 32–33.
231. BCPA, supra note 39.
232. CRSPA, supra note 40.
233. CRBPA, supra note 41.
234. BCPA, supra note 39, at § 1 (“Boulder Dam” was the original name of Hoover
Dam).
235. CRSPA, supra note 40, at § 1 (“Curecanti” was the original name of the Aspinall
unit).
236. CRBPA, supra note 41, at § 1521.
237. JENNIFER ZUNIGA, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, THE CENTRAL ARIZONA PROJECT
34–35 (2000).
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to have been built within the basin. “No substantial reclamation
projects have been authorized” over roughly the past half centu238
ry.
In lieu of structural solutions and their attendant drawbacks,
demand management has emerged as a top policy priority within
the Colorado River Basin during recent decades, undoubtedly
spurred by the historic drought. Released in 2012, the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation’s extensive Colorado River Basin Water Supply and
Demand Study (Basin Study) and its Moving Forward effort offer a
239
testament to this idea. The Basin Study identified the potential
for substantial water conservation in the agricultural, municipal,
240
and industrial sectors. The Moving Forward effort, in turn, has
largely focused on these priorities. 241 According to its Phase I Report, agricultural productivity in areas receiving Colorado River
water has increased about twenty-five percent since 1980, while water use and acreage have remained relatively constant. In part, this
242
pattern is due to improved water management. Likewise, a host
of future conservation measures were outlined in the Phase I Report, as well as an estimate from the Basin Study regarding additional water conservation and fallowing that could potentially yield
243
1.0 maf in annual savings by 2060. In the municipal and industrial sector, the Phase I Report similarly noted that per capita water
use rates had decreased by twelve percent, to thirty-eight percent
overall, since 1990 in major metropolitan areas that receive Colo244
rado River water—an annual water savings of 1.7 maf as of 2010.
It also described major water providers’ plans for more than
700,000 acre-feet of additional water conservation and 400,000
245
acre-feet of additional water reuse, annually by 2030.
Examining the Indus Basin through this lens, neither India nor
Pakistan have invested significantly in demand-management solutions, even though they may offer the cheapest per-gallon source
of water available—much cheaper than expensive new dams and
diversions. For instance, the World Bank estimated a lending pro-

238. Id. at 52.
239. For another recent example of the prioritization of demand management in the
Colorado River Basin, see Pilot System Conservation Program, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/PilotSysConsProg/pilotsystem.html (last visited
April 5, 2018).
240. TECHNICAL REPORT F, supra note 228, at F-38 to -53.
241. PHASE I REPORT, supra note 18, at 3-1 to -66, 4-1 to -44.
242. Id. at 4-14.
243. Id. at 4-43.
244. Id. at 3-62.
245. Id. The report outlines nearly a dozen future opportunities for increasing municipal and industrial water conservation and reuse. Id. at 3-63.
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gram totaling $1.2 billion in 2005, 246 while a more recent international consortium of partners to Pakistan’s water sector estimated
an investment program of more than $30 billion, mainly focused
247
on large dam construction. These are huge figures, and a country should think carefully before undertaking such actions, especially given the downsides of large-scale infrastructure identified
above. In contrast, the potential for demand-side savings is greatest
in systems where a significant portion of water is wasted, as is the
case in Pakistan. One study found that Pakistan’s canal system loses
248
twenty-five percent of its water to line waste and leakage. Meanwhile, the total volume of conveyance losses in the surface irriga249
tion system is colossal—an estimated seventy-three maf annually.
Further, cropping intensity in some canal commands along the
length of a canal is double at the heads as compared to the tails,
meaning that farmers at the end of the length of a canal may be
getting half the amount of water that farmers closer to the source
of supply receive. This disparity indicates both massive conveyance
250
losses as well as inequities in canal water distribution. In light of
these figures, a recent United States Senate Report noted: “[M]any
experts agree that these countries [i.e., Pakistan] must start shifting their focus from increasing the supply of water to decreasing
251
their demand for it.” The report outlined a variety of demandmanagement methods: “installing water gauges, collecting
groundwater use and recharge, promoting water reuse, improving
efficiencies in delivery, and trainings on how to budget water
252
among users.” While there is much room for improvement, these
methods reflect the policy trends in the Colorado River Basin, and
they also should in the Indus Basin.
Unfortunately, India and Pakistan still believe that building
more dams will offer a solution. India has had thirty-three multi253
purpose dams under construction or planned in recent years.
Pakistan’s WAPDA, meanwhile, also has a long list of dam projects
under construction or in the planning stages. While the bulk of
projects focus on hydropower development, adding storage dams

246. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at 123–25.
247. A PRODUCTIVE AND WATER-SECURE PAKISTAN, THE REPORT OF THE WATER SECTOR
TASK FORCE OF THE FRIENDS OF DEMOCRATIC PAKISTAN (2013), http://metameta.nl/wpcontent/uploads/2013/11/FoDP-WSTF-Report-Final-09-29-12.pdf [hereinafter TASK FORCE].
248. BAKSHI & TRIVEDI, supra note 63, at 6.
249. SARFRAZ KHAN QURESHI, Water, Growth and Poverty in Pakistan, in BACKGROUND
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 15.
250. Ahmad, Water Balance and Evapotranspiration, in BACKGROUND PAPERS, supra note 78,
at 23.
251. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
252. Id. at 17.
253. Id. at 9.
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and extending attendant irrigation infrastructure remain priorities. In total, WAPDA lists thirty-eight projects under headings of
“under construction,” “ready for construction,” or “future” pro254
jects. WAPDA’s plans include its flagship multi-purpose Diamer
Bhasha Dam along the Upper Indus, with a gross storage capacity
of 8.1 maf that will enable it to supplement water supplies to existing irrigated areas, as well as generate an additional 4,500 mw of
255
electricity for the national grid. More recently, Pakistan’s Supreme Court has taken the lead in ensuring that the Diamer Bhasha and Mohmand dams are constructed on a priority basis, and
the country’s Chief Justice has ordered the creation of a national
256
collection fund to finance the construction.
Pakistan should pay serious attention to striking a different balance between demand management and structural solutions. As
Bengali describes: “The obsession with engineering/civil works
projects has been so all-encompassing that little or no attention has
been accorded to an alternative sociocentric paradigm that would
incorporate elements of development, management, and conserva257
tion of water resources.” There are many policy tools to improve
water efficiency and conservation. Some are focused on agriculture: lining conveyance canals, laser leveling fields, switching to
less water-intensive crops, using drip irrigation instead of flood irrigation, paying farmers to conserve, eliminating subsidies, and
258
metering water. Other solutions are aimed at municipal and industrial users: establishing tiered water rates, replacing inefficient
water appliances with high-efficiency models, using water barrels
and roof-top cisterns to collect rainwater, removing water-intensive
259
vegetation, and replacing aging, leaking delivery pipes. Taken
together, these methods can dramatically reduce water use.
For Pakistan to prioritize demand management, it will undoubtedly require a fundamental shift in thinking, an earnest mustering
of political will, and quite possibly considerable funding (including
international and/or bilateral assistance). But given that just a single dam, Diamer Bhasha, is expected to cost upwards of fourteen

254. Descriptions of these projects can be accessed via the “projects” link at WAPDA,
supra note 73.
255. Diamer Basha Dam, WAPDA, http://www.wapda.gov.pk/index.php/projects/hydropower/ready-for-construction/diamer-basha-dam (last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
256. Bhatti, supra note 15.
257. Bengali, supra note 106, at 46.
258. See generally MICHAEL COHEN ET AL., PACIFIC INST., WATER TO SUPPLY THE LAND:
IRRIGATED AGRICULTURE IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN (2013) (discussing policy tools),
http://pacinst.org/app/uploads/2013/05/pacinst-crb-ag.pdf; Evans & Sadler, supra note
227.
259. See generally CHRISTIAN-SMITH & GLEICK, supra note 227 (discussing policy tools);
GLENNON, supra note 227; Wescoat, supra note 227.
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billion dollars and take approximately a decade to complete, the
country should earnestly explore adopting demand management
260
techniques. Indeed, this shift appears essential if Pakistan’s irrigated empire is to continue to exist.
4. Water Banking
Water banking is a relatively new approach to water management. It is something akin to a savings account for water. During
years of surplus flows, or due to effective conservation measures, a
water-using jurisdiction and water users therein can “bank” unused
water, either in a reservoir or an underground aquifer, to be accessed during times of scarcity. In some areas, “[w]ater banks promote efficient water use by facilitating agreements between users
who can reduce water consumption cheaply (sellers) and those
261
who cannot (buyers).” Water banking can be pursued through
many different arrangements.
Water banking has emerged in recent decades as an important
aspect of the demand-management policy trend in the Colorado
River Basin, particularly since the beginning of the historic
drought. Several illustrations exist at the international and inter262
state levels.
In addition to its shortage sharing regime discussed earlier, Minute 323 to the U.S.-Mexico Treaty contains three innovative programs that allow Mexico to defer treaty deliveries and store unused
263
flows in Lake Mead. These programs are not labeled international water banking programs; however, they operate in this way. Specifically, Minute 323 permits Mexico to store intentionally unused
treaty water in Lake Mead when Mexico is unable to utilize the
flows due to potential emergencies (earthquakes, conveyance-

260. Shahbaz Rana, Pakistan Stops Bid to Include Diamer-Bhasha Dam in CPEC, EXPRESS
TRIBUNE (Nov. 15, 2017), https://tribune.com.pk/story/1558475/2-pakistan-stops-bidinclude-diamer-bhasha-dam-cpec/.
261. REED WATSON & BRANDON SCARBOROUGH, PROP. AND ENV’T RESEARCH CTR.,
COLORADO RIVER WATER BANK: MAKING WATER CONSERVATION PROFITABLE at 4 (2010),
https://www.cbd.int/financial/pes/usa-peswatercolorado.pdf.
262. Although omitted for the sake of brevity, intrastate water banking schemes have
also emerged, or are emerging, within the basin states. The Arizona Water Banking Authority cannot go unmentioned. Background, ARIZONA WATER BANKING AUTHORITY,
http://www.azwaterbank.gov/Background/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2017). It banked more
than 3.4 maf of Arizona’s Lower Colorado River apportionment from 1997 to 2016. AWBA
Intrastate Report: Statewide Deliveries & Long Term Storage Credits, ARIZONA WATER BANKING
AUTHORITY, http://www.azwaterbank.gov/Ledger/Report_1.aspx (last visited Nov. 20,
2017).
263. MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 8–11.
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system failures, etc.), 264 or Mexico is able to rely on water yielded
from conservation projects (such as canal lining) or augmentation
265
projects (such as desalination plants) in lieu of treaty water. Deferred deliveries in the former category are referred to as “emergency storage,” while those in the latter category bear the label “In266
tentionally Created Mexican Allocation” (ICMA). In addition,
Minute 323 establishes a “Revolving Account” that allows Mexico to
store water in the United States up to a volume of 366,136 acre267
feet. Taken together, Minute 323 references the waters associated with these three programs as “Mexico’s Water Reserve” and im268
poses various limitations on their storage and delivery. Collectively, the programs enable Mexico to bolster Lake Mead’s elevation so
269
as to stave off shortage-based treaty delivery reductions.
There have been similar developments at the interstate level
along the Lower Colorado River. Three programs are in play there,
all of which interface with the Supreme Court’s Arizona v. California
270
Decree, yet leave its apportionment scheme intact.
Perhaps most noteworthy is an “Intentionally Created Surplus”
271
(ICS) program established by the Interim Guidelines in 2007.
This program is the domestic predecessor of Minute 323’s ICMA
program. It is composed in a similar manner, allowing parties entitled to receive Lower Colorado River water to forego such deliveries and, instead, to rely on water yielded from conservation or
augmentation activities, such as canal lining, land fallowing, and
272
desalination programs. These parties create and store ICS in
Lake Mead and later request delivery of the ICS from the Secretary

264. Id. at 8. This program has antecedents in both Minute 319 and Minute 318. MINUTE
319, supra note 210, at 4; INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N, MINUTE 318: ADJUSTMENT OF
DELIVERY SCHEDULES FOR WATER ALLOTTED TO MEXICO FOR THE YEARS 2010 THROUGH 2013
AS A RESULT OF INFRASTRUCTURE DAMAGE IN IRRIGATION DISTRICT 014, RIO COLORADO,
CAUSED BY THE APRIL 2010 EARTHQUAKE IN MEXICALI VALLEY, BAJA CALIFORNIA (2010),
https://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min_318.pdf.
265. MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 8. This program stems from a predecessor in Minute
319. MINUTE 319, supra note 210, at 7–10.
266. MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 8.
267. Id. The volumetric limit is based upon Mexico’s cumulative deferred deliveries under Minute 319 and Minute 318. Id.
268. Id. at 8–11.
269. MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 8–9. For information about Mexico’s use of deferred deliveries programs between 2011 and 2015 (i.e., pursuant to Minute 319 and Minute
318), see Robison, supra note 19, at 508.
270. See supra notes 189–191 and accompanying text. Article II(B)(6) of the Decree underpins the programs.
271. Interim Guidelines ROD, supra note 193, at 38–43. For information about water
users’ use of the ICS program, see Robison, supra note 19, at 547–48.
272. These activities fall into four ICS categories: Extraordinary Conservation ICS, Tributary Conservation ICS, System Efficiency ICS, and Imported ICS. Interim Guidelines ROD,
supra note 193, at 38–39.
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of the Interior. Limitations apply to both ICS creation and retrieval. 273
Worth noting alongside the ICS program is a “Developed Shortage Supply” (DSS) program that was also implemented under the
274
Interim Guidelines. In a nutshell, it resembles the ICS program
on a smaller scale by enabling parties entitled to Lower Colorado
River water to create DSS in and to request DSS deliveries from
Lake Mead, albeit with stricter limitations on both creation and de275
livery.
Finally, there has been an interstate program focusing on water
banking in groundwater aquifers and off-stream reservoirs—rather
than in Lake Mead—in the Lower Basin since 1999, predating the
276
Interim Guidelines by almost a decade. “Storage and Interstate
277
Release Agreements” (SIRAs) are the program’s centerpieces.
SIRAs generally contemplate a “storing entity” banking Lower Colorado River water in groundwater aquifers or off-stream reservoirs
and developing “Intentionally Created Unused Apportionment”
278
(ICUA). In turn, at a later date, the storing entity relies on this
banked water and asks the Secretary of the Interior to release the
ICUA from Lake Mead for use by a “consuming entity” in a different Lower Division state.
Despite major contextual differences between the Colorado and
Indus basins with regard to the feasibility of designing and imple279
menting water banks, such institutions may nonetheless prove
quite beneficial in ameliorating allocation tensions in the Indus
Basin. While banking requires a relationship of trust and collaboration between an investor and a bank, an effective banking
scheme has similar advantages to a large storage dam. It mediates
dramatic variations in flow by evening out wet and dry seasons so
that water users have a dependable supply. Likewise, a water bank
can incentivize conservation and alleviate drought impacts or other
fluctuations in flow. Furthermore, a water bank can be a source of
revenue for the banker—the entity that agrees to store water.
Implicit in the recognition of these benefits is a suggestion informed by the policy trends in the Colorado River Basin. There
273. See id. at 40–43 (prescribing ICS creation and delivery rules).
274. Id. at 44–46.
275. Id.
276. 43 C.F.R. §§ 414.1–414.6 (2016). For information about water users’ use of the
Lower Basin interstate water banking program, see Robison, supra note 19, at 544–45.
277. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 414.2, 414.3(a)(1)–(18) (2016) (detailing SIRA features and defining “storing entity” and “consuming entity”).
278. Id. § 414.2.
279. Telephone Conversation with Peter Rogers, Gordon McKay Professor of Environmental Engineering and Professor of City and Regional Planning, Harvard University (July
26, 2017).
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should be studies in the Indus Basin to assess potential designs and
implementation strategies for transboundary water banks. 280 Such
studies would function as feasibility studies and address a variety of
design- and implementation-related matters. Legal authority is a
threshold issue. To what extent, if any, do the IWT’s and Water
Accord’s provisions, in their current forms, allow for international
or interprovincial water banks? Notably, the accord’s provisions
281
provide some measure of optimism on this question. Another
pivotal subject is infrastructure. It is essential to evaluate existing or
282
future storage options for water banking. In light of the commentary above regarding demand management and drawbacks of
large-scale infrastructure, Indus Basin water-banking infrastructure
might be qualitatively different than that utilized for the Law of the
River’s ICS and DSS programs and may instead prioritize offstream reservoirs or even aquifers. In turn, dovetailing with these
infrastructural matters are a host of topics that deserve attention,
such as funding mechanisms and water-bank administration. As
with the recommendations for allocational flexibility and shortage
sharing, sequencing should be considered. Initial feasibility studies
for interprovincial water banks within Pakistan may generate valuable capacity for subsequent endeavors at the international level.
5. Water Marketing
Closely connected to water banking is water marketing. The latter refers to the voluntary act of selling, leasing, or trading water
283
and related resources and services. Multiple benefits can flow
280. Although this material focuses on interprovincial water banks, this Article relies on
the accord to suggest that provinces should also investigate potential schemes within their
jurisdictions. The accord places no restrictions on provinces developing water banks that
keep within respective provincial shares. Accord, supra note 8, at para. 8.
281. Two provisions should be noted in this regard. First, paragraph 14(e) commits parties to make efforts to avoid wastage and allows a province to use the share of another province without establishing any rights to the water used. Id. at ¶ 14(e). These terms could be
understood as opening the possibility for a province to store its water in another province
through a voluntary agreement. Second, paragraph 4 allocates surplus shares to provinces—
that is, shares of both flood supplies, as well as future storage—as percentages of total supplies. Id. at ¶ 4. Given that this provision points to surpluses, its utility is only realizable if
infrastructural means exist for storing and using such water in the future—e.g., water banking.
282. See BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at xix (explaining that the Indus Basin’s storage capacity in 2005 was equivalent to approximately thirty days of average river flows, while
Colorado River Basin’s storage capacity approximated more than 800 days).
283. See generally WESTERN GOVERNORS’ ASS’N & WESTERN STATES WATER COUNCIL, WATER
TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: PROJECTS, TRENDS, AND LEADING PRACTICES IN VOLUNTARY WATER
TRADING (2012), https://www.westgov.org/images/dmdocuments/Water_Transfers_in_
the_West_2012.pdf [hereinafter WGA]; see generally Lawrence MacDonnell, Transferring Water Uses in the West, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 119, 122 (1990).
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from such transactions, including “allocating water to new highvalue uses, incentivizing efficiency and avoiding political or regulatory water allocation decisions.” 284 Water marketing often involves
exchanges between individual water users as willing sellers and
buyers, but it can also be accomplished through innovative partnerships between governments and corporate entities to increase
285
efficiency and cost savings. To be sure, water marketing can be
286
controversial, primarily due to third-party impacts. With an appropriate set of guidelines to protect third parties, however, water
287
marketing can generate widespread benefits.
Water marketing is an important, but somewhat dichotomous,
policy topic in the Colorado River Basin. The dichotomy comes
from policymakers’ views about the jurisdictional scale at which water markets should exist, be it intrastate or something broader.
On one hand, water transfer schemes exist at the intrastate level
288
within all of the basin states, and the foregoing benefits of these
schemes are widely recognized, as are the risks of third-party im289
pacts and the concomitant need for protective guidelines. The
Colorado River Basin is actually the site of “the largest agricultural290
to-urban water transfer in United States history.” Contained within the 2003 Quantification Settlement Agreement, this transfer entails 300,000 acre-feet of Lower Colorado River water being transferred annually from agricultural to urban areas in Southern Cali291
California.
Expanding beyond the intrastate level, however, it is fair to say
that jurisdictionally broader water marketing schemes have been
lightning rods for controversy in the Colorado River Basin since at

284. WGA, supra note 283, at 3.
285. RACHEL BROMBAUGH, MCKINSTRY, TAPPING THE POWER OF THE MARKET: ENERGY
SAVINGS, WATER CONSERVATION, AND NEW REVENUE STREAMS THROUGH PERFORMANCE
CONTRACTING IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN STATES 11–17 (2015), http://western
resourceadvocates.org/publications/tapping-the-power-of-the-market/.
286. See generally Joseph L. Sax, Understanding Transfers: Community Rights and the Privatization of Water, 14 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 33 (2008).
287. See id. at 38.
288. For a recent comparative analysis of the basin states’ schemes with regard to environmental water rights transfers, see LEON SZEPTYCKI & DAVID PILZ, STANFORD WOODS INST.
FOR THE ENV’T, COLORADO RIVER BASIN ENVIRONMENTAL WATER TRANSFERS SCORECARD
(2017), http://waterinthewest.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/Co_River_Basin_Env_Transfers
_Scorecard.pdf.
289. See generally WGA, supra note 283.
290. Jason A. Robison, Colorado River Water in Southern California: Evolution of the Allocation
Framework, 1922–2015, 27 W. LEGAL HIST. 139, 165 (2014) (quoting Quantification Settlement Agreement Cases, 201 Cal. App. 4th 758, 788 (2011)).
291. See id. at 162–76 (discussing QSA’s genesis, composition, post-formation litigation,
and intertwined future with federal and state efforts to restore Salton Sea).
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least the 1980s. 292 Notwithstanding advocacy by commentators and
293
several proposals of different types —including in conjunction
294
with the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Basin Study —there are no
full-fledged water markets at the basin-wide scale or sub-basin scale
at this time. Arguably the closest approximation of such schemes
stems from the Lower Basin interstate water banking program described above. It enables non-federal parties to a SIRA to assign
their interests in the agreement, in whole or part, to authorized
295
entities. Neither Minute 323’s programs involving Mexico’s Water Reserve, nor the Interim Guidelines’ ICS and DSS programs,
appear to contain analogous terms. These measures expressly address the retrieval of water stored in Lake Mead by parties that
have undertaken such storage, rather than market-based transfers
of the stored water by such parties.
As in the Colorado River Basin, there could be enormous potential for water marketing in the Indus Basin—again, notwithstanding salient contextual differences. Because water marketing is effectively a contractual partnership between water-using entities,
ranging from national government to subnational governments to
private parties, one can envision a wide range of water marketing
296
scenarios.
As just one example at the international level, if an Indian hydropower entity were interested in holding back water on one of
the western rivers to increase hydropower production, it could
contract with farmers downstream in Pakistan to, in effect, purchase the portion of their crops that would be lost due to decreased water deliveries. Such a deal would foreseeably provide
292. For an insightful survey of this trajectory, see COLORADO RIVER GOVERNANCE
INITIATIVE, CROSS-BOUNDARY WATER TRANSFERS IN THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN: A REVIEW OF
EFFORTS AND ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH MARKETING WATER ACROSS STATE LINES OR
RESERVATION BOUNDARIES (2013), http://scholar.law.colorado.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1003&context=books_reports_studies.
293. See id. at 48–52 for a useful compilation of primary and secondary sources in this
area.
294. A proposal for a basin-wide “Water Banking Transfer Scheme” was submitted in
conjunction with the Basin Study. Id. at 40. This proposal can be accessed as Record No. 101
in U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER SUPPLY AND DEMAND
STUDY, APPENDIX F2: OPTIONS SUBMITTED TO THE STUDY F2-12 (2012), https://www.usbr.
gov/lc/region/programs/crbstudy/finalreport/Technical%20Report%20F%20-%20Development
%20of%20Options%20and%20Stategies/Appendix%202%20-%20Options%20Submitted
%20to%20the%20Study/Appendix%20F2%20-%20Options%20Submitted%20to%20the
%20Study.pdf.
295. 43 C.F.R. § 414.3(d). “Authorized entities” are entities authorized under state law to
enter into SIRAs. Id. at § 414.2(1).
296. Although the material below focuses on international and interprovincial scenarios,
water marketing on an intraprovincial basis also may hold promise—for example, water
marketing among agricultural and municipal water users in the same province. Given current relations between India and Pakistan, as well as mistrust among Pakistan’s provinces,
such intraprovincial transfers may pave the way for the sequenced growth of water markets.
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high-value energy to India and secure a market for Pakistani farmers’ crops at an attractive rate. This scenario would not inherently
mean that the contracted farmers could not produce the crop:
They could change to a low-water crop, invest in a more efficient
irrigation system, or cut back on acreage. In such a situation, the
farmers would actually receive more monetarily from the exchange
than if their crops had been grown and sold. Likewise, the Indian
hydropower entity could use the additional water at precisely the
times that would provide the most benefit to its customers and
maximize economic returns. While this scenario is neither relationally realistic at present, nor permitted by the IWT’s existing
297
terms, it nonetheless illustrates the ways in which potential transactions might be crafted if institutions were to move in this direction.
Other potential scenarios exist at the interprovincial level. For
instance, as explained in Part II, IRSA has exempted the two smaller provinces from the terms of the accord so that they do not have
to share proportionately in shortages and receive their full accord
298
shares when water availability is reduced. Even though this practice does not affect their allocated shares, they are still unable to
use these shares because budget constraints both limit their developed infrastructure and create an additional grievance in the
shortage sharing province. As already noted, this policy continues,
299
even though it is hotly contested. To reiterate, in this scenario,
planners should consider devising a mechanism that creates a winwin and moves beyond current practices. If select provinces are to
receive full shares regardless of water availability, then IRSA could
create an explicit mechanism to compensate co-sharers who give
up portions of their shares during shortages. In a collaborative,
transparent manner, planners could create a fee-generating mechanism by which the provinces that enable such “shortage insulation” can also gain from that policy, instead of feeling as though
they are subject to inequitable decisions made without their input.
Notably, in the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank promoted a vision of water management in the Indus Basin that was guided by a
belief that increased water trading via explicit recognition of prop-

297. IWT, supra note 3, at Art. III(1)–(2) (providing “Pakistan shall receive for unrestricted use all those waters of the Western Rivers which India is under obligation to let
flow,” except for certain defined and restricted uses).
298. Rajput, supra note 162, at 121–22. The rationale offered is that, as the smaller provinces use less irrigation water in the overall context of interprovincial water use, they should
be exempt from shortage sharing. Meanwhile, Sindh claims that its interests are disproportionately harmed by this decision, as it is the only province in this situation that bears the
burden of shortages.
299. See supra notes 160–164 and accompanying text.
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erty rights could be more efficient. 300 Two processes were instrumental: creating farmer organizations and water user associations
and transforming the irrigation bureaucracy nested in the provincial administrative domain into an authority capable of enabling
trades between private irrigators. The goal was to transition from
highly bureaucratized and centralized water management towards
a user-managed system open for trading. The transition was incentivized by offering funds for watercourse rehabilitation to farmers
who came together in the new cooperative forms. Unfortunately,
however, when the funds for physical infrastructure rehabilitation
and upgrade were depleted, farmers no longer had an incentive to
301
participate. Planners must find other ways to incentivize such cooperative user behavior, and enabling users to trade water in the
Indus should be a priority.
Certain important preconditions inhered in the World Bank’s
envisioned system, and they deserve careful attention from policymakers contemplating future water markets in the Indus Basin. As
an initial matter, the tradability of water allocations depends in
large part on the certainty of their existence and composition. Entitlements to water require enough certainty for market mechanisms to be able to price them. Policymakers will need to ensure
the reliability of water allocations in order to enable functional
market-based systems. Related to the certainty precondition is an
infrastructural one that overlaps with water banking issues. Adequate storage and delivery infrastructure must exist to enable water
markets. As an example, in gravity flow irrigation systems such as
the Indus Basin’s canal network, farmers have a timed allocation of
flow (warabandi), which, in theory, means that they are guaranteed
302
particular volumes of water. In practice, however, this premise is
severely unrealistic, as it erroneously assumes canals have an even
height and consistent flow rate. This disparity means that time allocations actually do not guarantee users particular volumes of wa303
ter—not all turns are equal. The effects go far beyond simple in-

300. Pakistan—On-Farm and Command Water Management and Irrigation Systems Rehabilitation
Projects, INDEP. EVALUATION GRP., THE WORLD BANK GRP., http://lnweb90.worldbank.org/
oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/07A8B67C8A94D0EE852567F5005D3A1E
(last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
301. See generally Arshad Ali & Mohammad Afzaal Khan, The Actual and Potential Roles of
Water Users’ Associations in Irrigated Agriculture, in SUSTAINABLE DEV. POLICY INST., WATER AND
COMMUNITY – AN ASSESSMENT OF ON-FARM WATER MANAGEMENT PROGRAMME 126, 127
(Chaudhry Inayatullah ed., 1996).
302. ROBERT CHAMBERS, MANAGING CANAL IRRIGATION – PRACTICAL ANALYSIS FROM
SOUTH ASIA xxvi (1988).
303. Faizul Hasan & Don Blackmore, Water Rights and Entitlements, in BACKGROUND
PAPERS, supra note 78, at 230.
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equitable impacts on farmers at the tail ends of canals. 304 In this
situation and others, the takeaway is that adequate storage and delivery infrastructure must exist for trading to occur.
Notwithstanding these conjoined issues of water-allocation certainty and facilitative infrastructure—coupled with equally pressing
needs for market administration and third-party protections—
establishing water markets in Pakistan appears feasible and war305
rants consideration by policymakers. This outlook for surfacewater transactions is grounded in current practices in Pakistan’s
portion of the basin—namely, existent groundwater transactions
between users who can afford to supplement their surface water
supplies by purchasing water from neighbors who have installed
306
tubewells with adequate pumping capacity. Such transactions utilize existing surface-water infrastructure for transport between
307
buyers and sellers. Given the modest scope of this infrastructure,
trading is limited to small distances, usually to neighboring land
holders and certainly within provincial boundaries. Nonetheless,
this precedent could offer valuable lessons for policymakers looking to design more formal and far-reaching water markets.
B. Transboundary Water Governance
1. Technical Capacity, Transparency,
and Independent Evaluation
Water management cannot occur without reliable technical data. Government agencies must have capacity to generate such data.
Further, as the resource for which such agencies are responsible is
inherently public in nature, notwithstanding contractual relationships among private parties, transparent dissemination of technical
data is essential. Independent entities capable of evaluating the data, as well as conducting research on similar subject matter, are
likewise crucial.
304. D.J. Bandaragoda & Saeed ur Rehman, International Irrigation Management Institute, Warabandi in Pakistan’s Canal Irrigation Systems: Widening Gap Between Theory and
Practice xi (1995), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNABY457.pdf.
305. See generally Agha Ali Akram, Is a Surface-Water Market Physically Feasible in Pakistan’s
Indus Basin Irrigation System?, 38 WATER INT’L 552 (2013).
306. See Bandaragoda & Rehman, supra note 304, at xi (describing how surface-water
turns on a watercourse are commonly traded while groundwater is more commonly purchased).
307. These groundwater markets highlight the inadequacy of surface water supplies and
the concomitant need to move toward conjunctive management of groundwater and surface
water. For a useful discussion of this topic, see Frank van Steenbergen et al., Key Challenges
and Opportunities for Conjunctive Management of Surface and Groundwater in Mega-Irrigation Systems: Lower Indus, Pakistan, 4 RESOURCES 831 (2015).
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These principles stem from hard-learned lessons in U.S. water
policy. Perhaps most memorable vis-à-vis the Colorado River Basin
and more broadly are episodes during the mid-twentieth century
where the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers produced skewed cost-benefit analyses to justify water
projects. One illustrative, highly visible epic involved the Bureau’s
unsuccessful attempt to construct the Echo Park Dam inside Dinosaur National Monument within the Upper Colorado River Basin
308
in the 1950s. Federal law was eventually changed to authorize ex309
ternal cost-benefit analyses and avoid built-in bias. Reflection upon these episodes is not meant to prosecute the past, but rather to
show that a good deal of thought has been, and continues to be,
given to data reliability in the Colorado River Basin.
Data collection related to the Colorado River system occurs via
the efforts of an array of government agencies in the United States
and Mexico. Increasingly, these agencies make their work product
publicly accessible online, albeit with time delays in certain cases.
The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC), a
joint body composed of United States and Mexican sections, is re310
sponsible for administering the U.S.-Mexico Treaty. Among other duties, the IBWC is charged with constructing, operating, and
maintaining gaging stations and other measuring devices to monitor flows and treaty deliveries, as well as compiling and exchanging
311
such data. The IBWC publishes the data in annual bulletins—
312
though recent copies are not available on the IBWC website —
and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation incorporates the data into an313
nual water accounting reports for the Lower Colorado River.

308. A seminal source on this dam controversy is MARK W.T. HARVEY, A SYMBOL OF
WILDERNESS: ECHO PARK AND THE AMERICAN CONSERVATION MOVEMENT (1994).
309. DANIEL MCCOOL, RIVER REPUBLIC: THE FALL AND RISE OF AMERICA’S RIVERS 42–50
(2012).
310. IBWC History, supra note 44.
311. Treaty, supra note 36, at Arts. 12(d), 24(f). See also Colorado River Boundary Section,
INT’L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM’N: UNITED STATES SECTION, https://www.ibwc.gov/Water_
Data/Colorado/Index.html (last visited April 5, 2018).
312. The most recent annual bulletin accessible on the IBWC’s website is from 2006.
UNITED STATES SECTION, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY & WATER COMMISSION, WATER
BULLETINS, https://www.ibwc.gov/Water_Data/water_bulletins.html (last visited Nov. 20,
2017). The IBWC also posts environmental reports and studies. UNITED STATES SECTION,
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY & WATER COMMISSION, REPORTS AND STUDIES, https://www.ibwc.
gov/EMD/reports_studies.html (last visited April 5, 2018).
313. See, e.g., U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER ACCOUNTING AND WATER
USE REPORT: ARIZONA, CALIFORNIA, AND NEVADA 29–30 (2016), https://www.usbr.gov/
lc/region/g4000/4200Rpts/DecreeRpt/2016/2016.pdf (providing annual and monthly
accounting of treaty deliveries).
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Turning to the domestic side in the United States, the Bureau is
the primary 314 federal agency with technical duties related to the
Colorado River system. Organized into an Upper Colorado Region
and a Lower Colorado Region, the Bureau generates a broad scope
of data and reports regarding the basin’s hydrology and flows, consumptive uses and diversions, and infrastructure conditions and
315
operations. The Bureau recently launched a pilot Reclamation
316
Water Information System enabling public access to its data.
Traditional technical documents produced and disseminated by
the agency—all mandated by federal law—include: (1) five-year
consumptive uses and losses reports for the Colorado River system
317
(often delayed in release); (2) annual water accounting reports
for Lower Colorado River diversions, return flows, and consump318
tive uses as identified above; and (3) annual operating plans for
319
The Upper Colorado River Commission
basin reservoirs.
(UCRC) consults with the Bureau on the consumptive uses and
losses reports. It is an interstate agency composed of federal and
state representatives responsible for administering the Upper Basin
320
Compact. The UCRC bears a host of responsibilities for generating technical data on flows, storage, consumptive uses, and diver321
sions, and produces associated annual reports. In addition, each
basin state has at least one water resource agency with technical ob-

314. The U.S. Geological Survey is also a key federal agency in this realm. See, e.g., Colorado River Basin Focus Area Study, USGS, https://water.usgs.gov/watercensus/colorado.html
(last visited April 5, 2018).
315. Water Operations, UPPER COLORADO REGION, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
https://www.usbr.gov/uc/water/index.html (last visited April 5, 2018); Lower Colorado River
Operations, LOWER COLORADO REGION, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.
gov/lc/riverops.html (last visited April 5, 2018).
316. Reclamation Water Information System, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://water.
usbr.gov/ (last visited April 5, 2018).
317. Colorado River System Consumptive Uses and Losses Reports, U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/reports/crs/crsul.html (last visited April 5, 2018). Unfortunately, the most recent report providing Lower Basin data is from
2005. Id.; U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, COLORADO RIVER BASIN CONSUMPTIVE USES AND
LOSSES REPORT 2001–2005 (2012), https://www.usbr.gov/uc/library/envdocs/reports/
crs/pdfs/cul2001-05.pdf.
318. Lower Colorado River Water Accounting, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.
gov/lc/region/g4000/wtracct.html#decree (last visited April 5, 2018).
319. Annual Operating Plans, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/uc/
water/rsvrs/ops/aop/ (last visited April 5, 2018).
320. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 37, at Art. VIII; UCRC, supra note 46.
321. Upper Basin Compact, supra note 37, at Art. VIII(d). Although currently limited to
the past five years, electronic copies of the UCRC’s annual reports can be accessed on the
UCRC website. Reports and Studies, UPPER COLORADO RIVER COMMISSION, http://www.ucr
commission.com/RepDoc/RS.html (last visited April 5, 2018).
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ligations pertaining to the state’s portion of the Colorado River system. 322
Independent evaluation of technical data generated and, hopefully, publicly disseminated by the agencies above is, of course, another part of the equation. The same can be said about independent entities wielding the capacity to produce freestanding research
on Colorado River Basin water management. Even extensive, pathbreaking work such as the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation’s Basin
Study stands to benefit from respectful yet critical analyses and
323
supplementary studies by external organizations. In the academic
realm, the National Academy of Sciences is exemplary in this vein,
having published a major study entitled Colorado River Basin Water
324
Management in 2007. Likewise, a cadre of academic entities focused on water-related technical and policy issues in the basin exists within and outside the basin states. 325 There is also exceptional
326
capacity in the non-governmental sector.
A host of issues involving lack of technical capacity, transparency, and independent evaluation loom large in the Indus Basin at
the international and interprovincial levels. Given the broad sweep
of governance reforms that may be warranted (or are arguably
necessary), this Article suggests priorities that deserve attention as
a starting point. They are cornerstones for the allocation- and conservation-related suggestions above.
With respect to the IWT, there is currently enormous distrust
between India and Pakistan regarding technical information about
existing and proposed projects. “[T]he treaty’s long-term stability

322. See, e.g., Colorado Water Conservation Board, COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD,
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES, http://cwcb.state.co.us/about-us/about-the-cwcb/
Pages/main.aspx (last visited April 5, 2018).
323. See, e.g., Baker Letter, supra note 59 (requesting National Academy of Sciences review of Colorado River programs associated with 2009 Secure Water Act and Basin Study
and its Moving Forward effort).
324. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, COLORADO RIVER
BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT: EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY
(2007), https://www.nap.edu/read/11857/chapter/1.
325. See, e.g., Center for Colorado River Studies, UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF
WATERSHED SCIENCES, https://qcnr.usu.edu/wats/colorado_river_studies/ (last visited April
5, 2018); Colorado River Governance, CENTER FOR NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, UNIVERSITY OF MONTANA, http://naturalresourcespolicy.org/projects/archives/
colorado-river-governance.php (last visited April 5, 2018); Colorado River Research Group,
COLORADO RIVER RESEARCH GROUP, http://www.coloradoriverresearchgroup.org/ (last visited April 5, 2018); Colorado Water Institute, COLORADO WATER INSTITUTE, COLORADO STATE
UNIVERSITY, http://www.cwi.colostate.edu/default.asp (last visited April 5, 2018); Ruth Powell
Hutchins Water Center, COLORADO MESA UNIVERSITY, http://www.coloradomesa.edu/watercenter/index.html (last visited April 5, 2018).
326. Examples of non-governmental organizations conducting work on the Colorado
River system include Audubon Society, Carpe Diem West, Environmental Defense Fund,
Glen Canyon Institute, Living Rivers/Colorado Riverkeeper, Pacific Institute, The Nature
Conservancy, Utah Rivers, and Western Resource Advocates.
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is threatened by a lack of trust between [the] two countries.”327
Among other remedial measures, relying on an external entity for
technical work might allay fears of manipulation. The role of data
generation, analysis, and dissemination could be performed by an
328
entity such as the U.N.’s inter-agency program, U.N. Water, federal water agencies, or a university consortium from outside the
region. This is not to suggest that external actors are superior to incountry entities, or that external actors might permanently supplant in-country entities. Ultimately, however, both countries need
reliable data that is worthy of their trust and shared openly. Allocating this function to a third party for an interim period could potentially meet these goals. Doing so could also foreseeably bring relationship- and capacity-building benefits that would be integral
over the longer time horizon to enable the external entity to, by
design, work itself out of a job.
Such an approach might also be beneficial for data generation
and dissemination, as well as fostering trust, among Pakistan’s
provinces. At present, Pakistan lacks “publicly available access to
consistent and comparable data on water supply, flow, and us329
age.” As a result, “[t]he country is literally flying blind into a very
330
hazardous future.” Although WAPDA is entrusted with the bulk
of data generation, the agency has a conflict of interest because it
is also responsible for infrastructure construction. Further, to the
extent that provincial agencies gather their own data, they suffer
from a lack of capacity and mistrust from peers in other provinces.
Provincial irrigation officials and, by implication, provincial members of IRSA are often viewed as compromised because they must
uphold their respective provinces’ points of view, thus making
them suboptimal generators or custodians of impartial and independently verifiable data. In short, an external technical entity
might add much value within Pakistan’s portion of the Indus Basin, injecting diversity and integrity to these activities, as well as
possibly balancing an overwhelmingly technocratic engineering
perspective of water management. Yet again the prospect of sequencing from the interprovincial to the international levels is
worth highlighting.

327. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 9.
328. About United Nations Water, U.N. WATER, http://www.unwater.org/about-unwater/
(last visited Nov. 20, 2017).
329. SENATE REPORT, supra note 6, at 2.
330. BRISCOE & QAMAR, supra note 70, at xviii.
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2. Collaboration
Finally, the discussion turns to a subject that is not only implicit
in the preceding material regarding generation, dissemination,
and independent evaluation of technical data, but also pervasive in
the topics covered in the transboundary allocation and conservation section: allocational flexibility, shortage sharing, demand
management, water banking, and water marketing. The Colorado
River Basin is far from a utopia regarding these important aspects
of water law and policy. However, advances made in these areas in
recent decades—particularly throughout the historic drought—
simply would not have been possible without a sustained commitment to collaboration among basin stakeholders. 331 Water law and
policy are by nature relational pursuits. Adversity breeds adversity
and can lay waste to the best laid plans of mice and men. Yet the
converse, of course, is also true.
One does not have to look far and wide for adversity in the Law
of the River’s evolution. A primer can be found in three unsuccessful U.S. Supreme Court lawsuits filed by Arizona in the 1930s. The
lawsuits challenged different aspects of the formation and interpretation of the Colorado River Compact and Boulder Canyon
332
Project Act. This litigation served as the preface of the tome that
was the U.S. Supreme Court’s principal Arizona v. California deci333
334
sion in 1963. Filed in 1952, it took eleven years for the Court to
render its decision, and another forty-three years for the Court to
335
issue a consolidated decree in 2006. The litigation’s tone could
not be conveyed more pitch-perfectly than by the late Charles
Meyers in his firsthand account of the trial’s commencement:
“[A]n air of Armageddon pervaded the room—though of course
there was sharp disagreement over the identity of the forces of
336
Good and Evil.”
In contrast, recent decades have seen remarkable growth in collaborative efforts surrounding Colorado River Basin water man-

331. See generally JOHN FLECK, WATER IS FOR FIGHTING OVER AND OTHER MYTHS ABOUT
WATER IN THE WEST (2016).
332. Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936); Arizona v. California, 292 U.S. 341
(1934); Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
333. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). See generally Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Arizona v. California: Its
Meaning and Significance for the Colorado River and Beyond After Fifty Years, 4 ARIZ. J. ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y 88 (2014), http://www.ajelp.com/articles/macdonnell-arizona-v-california-its-meaningand-significance/.
334. MacDonnell, supra note 333, at 95.
335. Decree, supra note 38.
336. Charles J. Meyers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L. REV. 1, 42 (1966). Meyers served as
a law clerk for Simon H. Rifkind, the Special Master who presided over the trial. A. Dan Tarlock, Tribute, 29 NAT. RES. J. 327, 328 (1989).
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agement. It would be disingenuous to present these efforts as panaceas, or to suggest that the parties involved have been oblivious to
the Law of the River’s framework and the associated prospect of
having to “duke it out” in adversarial settings such as litigation.
Nonetheless, there has been a marked trend toward inclusivity,
open communication, and compromise in international and interstate relations. Illustrations include Minute 323’s shortage sharing
regime, binational water scarcity contingency plan, and programs
337
involving Mexico’s Water Reserve. Whereas Mexico agreed via
the first and second measures to share in Lower Colorado River
shortages alongside the Lower Division states, the United States
agreed via the third measure to allow Mexico to store unused trea338
ty water in Lake Mead. A similar picture emerges at the interstate
level with the Interim Guidelines. Prior to the guidelines’ formation, the historic drought’s impact on reservoir storage triggered interpretive conflicts over the Colorado River Compact and
related laws that “brought the basin closer to multi-state and interbasin litigation than perhaps any time since adoption of the Com339
pact.” Instead of a repeat Arizona v. California-like proceeding,
however, the basin states engaged with other stakeholders in a National Environmental Policy Act process led by the Secretary of the
340
Interior. The guidelines were the fruit of this labor, bringing into
existence their shortage sharing regimes, ICS and DSS programs,
and a complementary Basin States’ Agreement. This Agreement
recognizes that “judicial or administrative proceedings are not preferred alternatives to the resolution of claims or controversies concerning the [L]aw of the [R]iver” and expresses the basin states’
collective commitment “to pursue a consultative approach to the
341
resolution of any claim or controversy.”
The collaborative trend within the Colorado River Basin, not
easily achieved and inched toward over a long period, is absolutely
critical as a reference point for the Indus Basin. Before reflecting
337. These measures are discussed supra Part III.A.2 (shortage sharing regime, binational water scarcity contingency plan) and Part III.A.4 (Mexico’s Water Reserve programs).
338. Minute 323 also implements an environmental flows program for the Colorado River Limitrophe and Delta that illustrates collaboration. MINUTE 323, supra note 192, at 15–18.
See also MINUTE 319, supra note 210, at 11–14 (establishing predecessor environmental flows
program).
339. Interim Guidelines ROD, supra note 193, at 11.
340. See generally COLORADO RIVER INTERIM GUIDELINES FOR LOWER BASIN SHORTAGES
AND COORDINATED OPERATIONS OF LAKES POWELL AND MEAD, FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT, U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, https://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/programs/
strategies/FEIS/ (last visited April 5, 2018).
341. U.S. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, AGREEMENT CONCERNING COLORADO RIVER
MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS 10 (Apr. 23, 2007), http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/
programs/strategies/DEIScomments/State/BasinStates.pdf. This agreement appears as attachment A of the linked document.
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in greater detail on the implications of possible collaboration and
its potential blooming internationally and/or interprovincially, it is
worth taking stock of the relationship between collaboration and
contestation. Working in the shadow of the law has a remarkable
ability to encourage parties to develop more cooperative norms, as
they presume an adjudicator with integrity will not hesitate to impose undesirable outcomes and are spurred to avoid this situation. 342 In the main, if a decision-maker is neutral and adequately
empowered—that is, possesses integrity—contestation in the form
of litigation can be expected to lead to more just results, to uphold
the rule of law, and to motivate collaboration. In the Indus Basin,
however, this neutral, empowered adjudicator is precisely what is
343
missing at both the international and interprovincial levels.
Drawing attention to this institutional vacuum does not diminish
the value added by collaborative processes—quite the opposite—
but rather simply illuminates the vacuum. Ideally, the Indus Basin
needs both types of institutions: ones that promote collaboration,
as well as ones in which parties can agree to compete, such as
courts, that thereby lead to an overall collaborative atmosphere.
Turning to collaboration proper, creating an atmosphere of
trust as a relational starting point for Pakistan and India is a difficult challenge at the international level. As briefly addressed in
Part II, the history of the IWT negotiations, coupled with the
weighty pressures encumbering the treaty in contemporary times,
344
present formidable obstacles for collaborative approaches. That
said, the IWT’s institutional mechanism of the Permanent Indus
Commission presents the best channel for this turn. For collaboration to occur, however, both countries will need to empower their
respective commissioners, as well as the commission as a collective
body, to assume much broader roles than their current remit of
simply operationalizing the IWT with mandated data exchanges
345
and site visits. In this regard, the IWT itself lights the way, ex346
pressly calling for future cooperation in Article VII : “The two
Parties recognize that they have a common interest in the optimum development of the Rivers, and, to that end, they declare

342. See generally Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
343. Moreover, the development of such institutional capacity may not be favorable to
powerful parties’ interests in the basin, and weaker parties may lack necessary resources to
pursue such an undertaking.
344. See Armin Rosencranz & Merlin Elizabeth Joseph, By Building the Sawalkot Dam, Is
India Using Water as a Weapon Against Pakistan?, THE WIRE, Mar. 20, 2017, https://thewire.
in/117410/sawalkot-dam-india-pakistan/.
345. See IWT supra note 3, at Art. VIII.
346. Id. at Art. VII.
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their intention to co-operate, by mutual agreement, to the fullest
possible extent.” 347 This provision can be read to constitute a “reset
button” for relations to escape from the clutches of tit-for-tat, zerosum norms that have been allowed to fester through the decades
and more so recently. These words of the IWT should be realized,
and the express wishes and goodwill of the treaty’s framers should
be built upon through novel mechanisms informed by the Law of
the River and other transboundary reference points.
Regarding interprovincial collaboration, a key institution is the
Council of Common Interests (CCI) established by Article 153(1)
348
of the 1973 Constitution of Pakistan. Headed by the Prime Minister and composed of the chief ministers of the provinces and relevant civil servants appointed by the federation, the CCI is charged
with resolving disputes between the federation and provinces as
349
well as interprovincial conflicts. Article 155 empowers the CCI as
350
the exclusive body for reviewing complaints about water supplies.
The CCI is not precluded, however, from setting up a commission
to advise it. With one lone caveat, the CCI is an ideal forum for fostering interprovincial collaboration in water planning and development, both for internal purposes within Pakistan as well as for
external purposes at the international level. Concerning the caveat, as the CCI is a political body, its decisions are always reported as
consensus discussions and subject to the perception that they are
reached through politically expedient negotiations, rather than being representative of actual issues raised by groups opposing the
351
dominant developmentalist narrative. In light of this concern, if
the CCI can develop more transparent norms for cooperative decision-making, perhaps including, but not limited to, public hearings, it appears to be an ideal institution for enabling interprovincial collaboration. Likewise, its decisions will have the added
advantage of bearing the imprimatur of the country’s politicians—
a great starting point for broader-based and informed democratic
participation in a hitherto overly-technocratic and closed-off water
sector.

347. Id. at Art. VII(1).
348. Sattar, supra note 117.
349. Id.
350. Const., art. 155 (Pak.) (amended 2010). The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution amended Article 155 to include within the CCI’s purview complaints about supplies
from “reservoirs.” Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act 2010 (Pak.), http://www.pakistani.
org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/18amendment.html. By implication, the CCI’s
exclusive role dictates that the country’s Supreme Court is not available to resolve water
supply-related disputes between parties, including provincial and federal institutions.
351. See Sattar, supra note 117, at 96–101 (discussing federal dispute resolution procedures within CCI).
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CONCLUSION
Millions of peoples’ lives and livelihoods depend upon the Indus
Basin’s waters and the institutions governing them. Enshrined
among these diverse entities and instruments are foundational
transboundary institutions, such as the IWT and Pakistan’s interprovincial Water Accord. While it is a hard pill to swallow, dysfunction and disarray undoubtedly capture the current state of these
institutions. From economic, environmental, political, and social
perspectives, the institutions inadequately serve Indian and Pakistani society, the disputed region of Kashmir, the emergent demand on the basin in Afghanistan, and the basin itself. One can
imagine the daunting plight of farmers in this regard, placed at the
mercy of erratic weather, climate change, and overallocation on
one hand and unreliable institutions and bureaucrats on the other.
As described by one farmer: “Rains have declined drastically and
we have to irrigate our fields with underground water. This has increased the cost of cultivating crops. With poor rains, the underground water level has also decreased by three to four feet during
352
the last three to four years.” Seeking to understand the water institutions that produce such uncertainty and demand so much in
the form of non-virtuous adaptive coping has motivated this comparative study.
Unequivocally, the Indus and Colorado basins are different places. This observation has spatial and temporal dimensions that, together, reflect the fundamental point of contextuality as it bears on
comparative water law and policy. There remain salient differences
and similarities between the basins in regard to their geographies,
histories, and water laws, policies, and associated institutions.
Likewise, this Article has attempted to be mindful of the Law of the
River’s complex, compelling yet ultimately imperfect nature.
Notwithstanding the import of contextuality and institutional
imperfection as threshold considerations, the Article’s core thesis
remains. Government officials tasked with implementing existing
water institutions in the Indus Basin and evolving successors to
these institutions should reflect in a critical, diligent manner on
the Law of the River. Put differently, the diverse and complex water institutions that have come into being across the preceding
century within North America’s most “institutionally encom353
passed” basin—institutions subject to rigorous study and novel
innovations over the past two decades during the unprecedented,
352. Saleem Sheikh, SciDev.Net, Pakistani Farmers Confounded by Erratic Weather, YOUTUBE
(Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Yy6ETXTDO8U.
353. FRADKIN, supra note 17, at 16.
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adaptation-forcing drought—should be regarded and harnessed as
valuable reference points for institutional design within the Indus
Basin and other contexts of transboundary water law and policy.
This broad-based prescription applies across the board to the topics canvassed in Part III.
In the realm of transboundary water allocation and conservation, existing international and interstate instruments in the Colorado River Basin—for example, the Arizona v. California Decree
and Minute 323’s shortage sharing regime and binational water
scarcity contingency plan—suggest the prospect of counterparts in
the Indus Basin, including an IWT variable deliveries scheme addendum or an equitable, functional pro rata shortage sharing re354
gime among Pakistan’s provinces. The same can be said about
demand management as a policy priority in the Colorado River Basin. To what extent, if any, have policymakers and water managers
in the Indus Basin given due consideration to such approaches in
lieu of the structural “solutions” of costly additional dams and reservoirs with attendant drawbacks? The unfortunate answer appears
355
to be: not much. Water banking and marketing are illustrative in
a similar way. While water markets have not yet taken root in the
Colorado River Basin beyond the intrastate level, transboundary
water banks exist in several forms along the Lower Colorado River,
including the ICS program at the domestic level and Minute 323’s
trio of programs addressing Mexico’s Water Reserve at the international level. Contextually tailored transboundary water banks and
markets seemingly also hold promise in the Indus Basin, and preliminary attention should be paid to basic design and implementation matters like administrative structures and processes, certainty
of entitlements, facilitative infrastructure, funding arrangements,
356
and legal authority.
Transboundary water governance similarly marks a broad domain where the Colorado River Basin offers reference points for
institutional evolution in the Indus Basin. Technical capacity in the
form of data generation and dissemination by government agencies is crucial in this area, as is the existence of external entities capable of independent data evaluation and research. Although
there is still much room for progress, technical capacity for generating data generally exists in the Colorado River Basin, stemming
from a suite of agencies such as the International Boundary and
Water Commission and U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, as well as arrayed academic entities and non-governmental organizations. At
354.
355.
356.

See supra Part III.A.1–2.
See supra Part III.A.3.
See supra Part III.A.4–5.
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both the international and interprovincial levels in the Indus Basin, an external technical entity may prove useful in performing
data generation and dissemination work over an interim period,
both for sake of the work itself as well as the capacity- and relation357
ship-building benefits. In a related fashion, reflecting the collaborative turn in Colorado River governance during recent decades,
this Article suggests that the Indus Basin might follow suit by empowering the Permanent Indus Commission and commissioners
under the IWT and utilizing the CCI for water-related interprovin358
cial collaboration within Pakistan.
At a conceptual as well as practical level, all parties must recognize that this Article proposes solutions with short-term costs but
long-term benefits. These benefits will accrue to people in the
countries of the basin for generations to come. The short-term
costs will be borne by some current users in the form of decreased
water allocations, increased operating costs, and more restrictive
operational controls. In practical terms, the best way to facilitate
such a trade-off is to compensate the “losers” and to amortize the
cost of that compensation over successive generations of the “winners.” This can be done through loans, long-term government
programs, and pay-back schemes that operate similar to a mortgage.
And that bring us to the words of former Pakistani President
Ayub Khan for conclusion. They were uttered in regard to the
IWT’s formation more than a half century ago. “[W]e have been
able to get the best that was possible . . . very often the best is the
enemy of the good and in this case we have accepted the good after careful and realistic appreciation of our entire overall situation . . . [T]he basis of this agreement is realism and pragma359
tism.” The future evolution of the IWT, interprovincial Water
Accord, and associated transboundary water institutions within the
Indus Basin should be guided by applying this pragmatic vision of
the treaty’s framers to the preceding reflections from the Law of
the Colorado River.

357. See supra Part III.B.1.
358. See supra Part III.B.2.
359. Sardar Muhamad Tariq, The Indus Waters Treaty and Emerging Water Management, in
PROBLEMS AND POLITICS OF WATER SHARING AND MANAGEMENT IN PAKISTAN 87, 88 (Pervaiz
Iqbal Cheema et al. eds., 2007).

